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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF John Robert Oreskovich for
the Master of Arts in History presented November 8, 1983.
Title:

American-Yugoslav Relations, 1941-1946.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

This thesis deals with the diplomatic relations
between Yugoslavia and the United States through the
Second World War and the first few months following the
end of the War.

It follows in chronological order the

events influencing American-Yugoslav relations.

Emphasis

is placed on the development of Yugoslav internal events
and their political implications.
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The United States, after some initial enthusiasm for
Yugoslavia, remained on the periphery of Yugoslav affairs,
but stayed in diplomatic contact with the Yugoslav government.

The American ability to remain outside of Yugoslav

events lessened as the war progressed.

The Partisan move-

ment and its leader, Tito, changed the political situation
within Yugoslavia.

This fact created a different set of

values in American dealings with Yugoslavia and eventually
led to the American recognition of a totally new type of
government in Yugoslavia.
Diplomatic relations between the United States and
Yugoslavia throughout the war were kept on a formal basis.
The United States kept its sight on what it deemed to be
its global responsibilities and needs and was sympathetic,
but not very helpful, to the Yugoslavs.

America had main-

tained relations with Yugoslavia for about twenty years
when the war broke out, but relations--both political and
economic--were not important between the two nations.
Neither country knew much about the other and, though the
war would change this parochial attitude to some degree,
relations with Yugoslavia remained at best of secondary
importance for the United States, as they were for Yugoslavia.
The American presence in Yugoslavia during the war
was minimal, with only a handful of mostly military personnel taking part.

Further~ore,

until quite late in the
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conflict, the American mission to the country subordinated
itself to the British.

The American policy was to keep out

of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav affairs as much as possible.
The changing political realities in Yugoslavia finally
brought more American attention there, but it remained a
minor part of America's greater international goals.
The Tito movement caused consternation and study by
the American government.

The United States remained in

contact with the Yugoslav monarchy to a much greater degree than the British, for example, and came only slowly
to accept Tito.

American officials wished for the Yugo-

slavs to enjoy the freedom of Western democracies, but
would learn of the repressive actions of Tito and recognize
his government in any case.
mad~

This recognition of Tito was

after America was assured that he would recognize

prior American and international claims against the previous Yugoslav governments.

America, to the end, wished

to husband her resources and give as few to Yugoslavia as
possible, especially after the face of the Tito regime
became more familiar.
The material for this thesis came from official
American diplomatic papers, predominantly Foreign Relations
of the United States Diplomatic Papers.

Where possible,

autobiographies were used, but for the most part they concentrated to only a minor degree, if at all, on AmericanYugoslav relations.

Periodicals were used, with the

4
greatest help coming from The New York Times.

Secondary

literature was used, but in most instances was of less
value than the diplomatic and autobiographical sources
used.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The United States was the first major power to
establish formal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia (then
called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes).
so on February 6, 1919.

It did

No break in these relations was to

occur, although American diplomatic representatives left the
country after Yugoslavia's defeat in April 1941.

The United

States had maintained an embassy at the Yugoslav capitol
at Belgrade.
in Zagreb.

There also was an American consulate located
The Yugoslavs maintained an embassy in

Washington, D.C. and several other offices in areas of
large, Yugoslav-American populations.
Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland.

These cities included
Yugoslavia also

maintained an information and tourist office in New York.
Although the American government maintained proper
relations with the Yugoslav government, it played an
insignificant role in matters pertaining to Yugoslavia.

The

most important political action, after recognition, was
performed in Congress.

This, of course, was the immigration

laws passed in 1921 and 1924.

These laws greatly restricted
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immigration from Yugoslavia and basically halted the most
important contract between the two countries--the emigration
of Yugoslavs to the United States.

These laws, coupled with

American isolationist feelings and the depression, greatly
limited American-Yugoslav interaction.
There was, however, commerce carried on between the two
nations throughout the inter-war period.

The United States

was one of Yugoslavia's major trading partners.

It ranked

sixth in volume and seventh in value in Yugoslavia's trade
relations.

The United States consumed 6.02% of all Yugoslav

exports, which, for the most part, consisted of raw
materials.
The most important American imports were copper, hops,
haricot beans, chrome ore and cement.

America, in turn, was
1

responsible for 5.07% of Yugoslav imports.

The United

States sent Yugoslavia raw cotton, vehicles, machinery and
instruments, leather, electrical equipment, and crude naptha
(petroleum).

This interaction was much more important to

Yugoslavia than to the United States.*

*

It showed how

Yugoslavia's largest and by far most important trading
partner during the period was Germany. Germany was
responsible for 35.94% of Yugoslav exports and for 32.52%
of Yugoslavia's imports. The trade relationship with
Germany, as it was with all of Yugoslavia's trading
partners was that of a supplier of foodstuffs and raw
materials which Yugoslavia would exchange for finished
goods. Germany was followed in importance by
Czechoslovakia (10.65% imports and 7.89% exports), Italy
(8.94% imports and 6.42% exports) Great Britain (8.67%
imports and 9.61% exports) and Austria (6.88% imports and
6.06% exports.)2

3

Yugoslavia was receiving for the most part finished goods
and exporting lower value raw materials--a classic example
of trade from a less developed country to a more advanced
one.
Yugoslavia's trade was largely conducted with Germany
and her future territories and Italy, Germany's most
important ally after 1936.

This fact plus Yugoslavia's

geographic isolation from the United States left America
with very little economic leverage when dealing with
Yugoslavia.
As previously stated, one of the main points of contact
between the United States and Yugoslavia had been the influx
of immigrants to the United States.

However, immigration

from Yugoslav areas was much smaller and developed later
than from northern and western Europe.

Until the end of the

19th century, this immigration had been a trickle and never
reached the size and importance of the Irish, for example.
In many cases, people of Yugoslav extraction were not even
recognized by their proper nationalities.

Examples abound

of Yugoslavs being listed as Austrians, Hungarians, and
Italians.

This is understandable since the greatest influx

of Yugoslav peoples occurred before a Yugoslav state or
nationality existed and before anyone identified themselves
as Yugoslav.
Another problem of recognition for Yugoslav
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contributions in America was the changing of surnames.

For

example, it was a Croatian named Antonije Lutit, born in
3

Split , who was the geologist who discovered ore in Texas.
His name is known as Anthony F. Lucas, and his ancestry is
for the most part unknown.

This, of course, applies to most

Slavic people whose names were "strange" and who lived under
foreign domination.

By 1940, it was estimated that there

were 1,000,000 Yugoslavs in the United States, including
both native and foreign born (500,000 Croatians, 300,000
4

Slovenes, and 200,000 Serbs).
The influence of these 1,000,000 people within the
United States was scant.

They represented less than 1% of

the total population, and many were not citizens, nor could
they speak English.

Economically, they were poor and worked

in the most menial and poorly-paid positions.

They tended

to be miners, farm laborers, and steelworkers and for the
most part lived tucked away in their own non-English
speaking portions of the community out of sight and out of
the way.

The greatest numbers of Yugoslavs lived near

Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, New Orleans, the mining
areas of Montana, and various fishing communities such as
San Pedro, California and Astoria, Oregon.
There were, of course, exceptions to this status, but
even here they received far less credit than they deserved.
For example, Nikola Tesla, a Serb born in Lika, Croatia, was

5
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the inventor of alternating current and the radio

among

his many contributions to electrical engineering.

He did

the vast majority of his work in the United States, and its
universal importance cannot be disclaimed.
have even heard of him.

Yet few people

He, like his fellow Yugoslav

immigrants, was far too busy working to enter the mainstream
of American life.
The lone shining light in America before the Second
World War was Louis Adamic.

Adamic was born in Laibach,

Austria (today Ljubljana, Slovenia).

He immigrated to the

United States at the age of fourteen, where he began to work
and study in the publishing industry.

He became a writer

and had many articles and books published and distributed
throughout the United States.

His most famous work was the

book Native's Return, published in New York in 1934.

This

book described the life of the peasant and his problems
under the dictatorship in Yugoslavia.

It gave America a

glimpse of land little known and made the author famous.
Adamic was very active throughout the United States
trying to help the immigrant to assimilate, but his greatest
influence came during World War II.

He would be invited to

the White House where he had dinner with President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill.

In the final stages of the

war, he worked hard for the recognition of Tito and his

6

Communists.*
This lack of knowledge by the American public of
Yugoslavia and her people was in sharp contrast to American
knowledge of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Although the

Yugoslavs had set up a committee in London during the First
World War like the others and had become independent at the
same time, they enjoyed far less prestige.

Yugoslavia had

no one of the national reknown of Poland's Ignace Jan
Paderewski or Czecholsovakia's Thomas Masaryk and Edward
Benes.

These men brought a recognition and status to their

countries that the nameless members of the Serbian Army,
however legendary their valor, could not bring for the
future state of Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was not to have such

a man until after the Second World War.
American officials and the public knew even less about
the internal political situation in Yugoslavia in 1940

*

Adamic, who died an apparent suicide at Riegelsville, New
Jersey, on September 4, 1951, was a prolific writer. He
started his career by translating stories from Slovenian,
Croatian, and Serbian into English. He wrote many books,
two of which have already been mentioned. The complete
list includes: Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in
America (published 1931); Laughing in the Jungle (1932,
an autobiographical volume); Grandsons (published 1935)
and Cradle of Life (published 1936), both of which dealt
with immigrant life; ~ America, 1928-1938 (published
1938) and From Many Lands (published 1940), both of which
were additional autobiographical volumes; Two-Way Passage·
(published 1941), which was a study of America's future
role in Europe and was the reason he was invited to the
White House. His final volume, published after his
death, was The Eagle and the Roots (published 1952), a
pseudo-biography of Tito.

7

than they did about the hardy Yugoslav immigrant now working
diligently in American industry.

Yugoslavia was a Balkan

country, and, as such, it carried a stigma for Americans.
The Balkan countries seemed to be places where wars were
started and politics made little if any sense to the
outsider.

This American understanding of Yugoslavia was

limited and its politics considered far too troublesome to
create a field of study in the United States.

It would take

a crash course in relations between the two countries during
the War before the United States would begin to understand
Yugoslavia.
The major concern for anyone who wished to understand
internal Yugoslav politics was the ethnic issue.

The ethnic

issue was dominated by a lack of understanding between
Yugoslavia's two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and the
Croats.

The Serbs, who were of the Orthodox faith, were 51%

of the population and dominated Yugoslavia.

The Croats, who

were Roman Catholic, were 31% of the population and resented
Serbian domination.
Serbia (including Montenegro) was the only portion of
Yugoslavia to have been independent before the First World
War, and naturally the Serbs considered themselves the
nucleus for an expanded Serbian/Yugoslav state.

The Croats,

on the other hand, had not been truly independent since
1102.

The Croats also had been part of the Austrian Empire,
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against whom the Serbs had just completed a devastating war.
Although these two peoples spoke virtually the same language
and had much the same cultural-historical heritage, they did
not share a common religion.

In Yugoslavia, one was most

commonly identified by his religion, and this fact colored
all decisions.
Distrust of Catholicism, tied up in their minds
with the hereditary enemies Austria, Hungary and
Italy, is deeply rooted in the Serbs. Moreover, the
Orthodox Church, which normally plays little part
in politics but comes to the front when the nation
is in danger, commands profound loyalty.6
It must be added that the Croats felt no less attached
to the Catholic church, which they believed nurtured their
cultural identity.

The feelings of linguistic togetherness

could never make up or even help to cover the prejudices of
the two groups for each other's religion.
The two peoples also differed on their views on
establishing the new country.

The Croats wished Yugoslavia

to be a federal state, while the Serbs sought and gained a
centralized and Serb-dominated administration.
Demands to become 'Yugoslav' were felt by Croats as
demands that they should throw over their whole
historial heritage and national consciousness,
cease to be Croats and become Serbs, citizens of a
centralized Serbian State.7
The Serbs dominated virtually all phases of the
Yugoslav government.

The Serbs, proud of their military

9
tradition, dominated the military.

"Of the 105 generals in

active service in 1938, 161 were Serbs, 2 were Croats*, and
8
Even in Croatia itself, the Serbs
2 were Slovenes."
dominated the civil service.

The Croats began to resent the

Serb-dominated police.
The gendarmerie, which was composed almost
exclusively of Serbs, was increased in number and
often behaved not only tactlessly but cruelly.
Croatian peasants were terrorized and robbed.9
The politics and the political parties, as might be
expected, reflected this situation.

Only one political

party in Yugoslavia was popular in all parts of the country.
This was the Communist party, which was outlawed in August
of

~921,

even after finishing a strong third in the national

elections of 1920.

The Communists were

the only major party whose appeal transcended
ethnic and regional particularism. They alone
affirmed the existence of a Yugoslav nation at a
time when official nomenclature was still committed
to the distinctiveness of its Serbian, Croatian,
and Slovene parts.10
The party would not die, but would not surface publicly
again until Yugoslavia was overrun and subjected to a brutal
occupation.
The political differences surfaced almost immediately

*

The German Army could claim as many generals of Croatian
descent, including Commander-in-Chief of the German Army
Walter von Brauchitsch and General Lothar Rendulic.
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in the new country.

After the initial elections, the Croats

felt powerless and the "Yugoslav" constitution was ratified
without Croation participation.

The constitution

emerged as a predominantly Serbian document,
democratic in the sense that it provided for a
single chamber elected by manhood suffrage and
guaranteed ministerial responsibility but strongly
centralist in character.11
The Serbs "did not trust the Croats and treated them as
12
a potentially hostile people"
, and therefore all phases of
the Yugoslav government were kept under the firm control of
the Serbs.

The Constitution was ratified in 1921, .but it

was not until 1925 that the Croats sent their first
representatives to the national assembly ("~kupltina").

The

Croats remained as participants for only a year and then
again refused to participate.
The Croats were led by Stjepan Radie, who was the head
of the Croatian Peasant Party.

The Croatian Peasant Party

was for years the sole political voice of the Croatians in
Yugoslavia. It had originally stood for political reform and
economic emancipation of the peasant masses.

However, with

its total domination of Croatian politics, it reflected the
entire political spectrum.

The Party was held together by

its struggle against the Serbs.*

*

The main role of the party

For a brief explanation of the Croatian Peasant Party,
see Hugh Setan-Watsan's Eastern Europe Between the Wars,
1918-1941, pp 227-230.
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was to better the Croatian position within Yugoslavia.

It

dealt with several Serbian parties and was considered by the
Serbs as an obstructionist force, detailing matters of
importance to the Yugoslav state.
The politics became so heated between the Croats and
the Serbs that on June 20, 1928, a Serbian politician shot
/

v

~

Radie and four other Croatian deputies in the "Skupstina."

Radi~'s death led to the implementation of a Yugoslav
dictatorship in 1929.

The country was now run by King

Alexander, who tried to avert any further conflicts.

The

King himself was a Serb and therefore a strong supporter
of the status quo (i.e., Serbian domination of Yugoslav
affairs).
The announcement of the dictatorship caused many Croats
to lose hope in the Yugoslav concept.

Led by Dr. Ante

Pavelic, they formed a separatist movement called the
~

v

"Ustasa,"*·

.,,

""'

The Ustasa was formed from the right of the

Croatian political movement and took members away from the
Croatian Peasant Party.

It would rule the Axis-dominated

(puppet) state of Croatia during the war. It

was interested

in obtaining Croat independence by any means, and would work
with anyone who would further this goal.

*

Its main support

"ustaaa", plural "Usta~e" or "Usterse Pokret" (U;ta~e
movement). Refers to the Croatian separatists or
Fascists. Literally translated, "U~ta~e" means insurgent
or rebel. Under Axis tutelage, the Ustase would rule the
"Independent State of Croatia" during World War II.
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outside the country came from Italy and Hungary, two nations

which covered large portions of Yugoslav territory.
Usta~a

The

was responsible in 1934 for the assassination of King

Alexander during his state visit to France.
The Yugoslav government now passed to the control of
Prince Paul, who was named regent until the Crown Prince was
old enough to rule.

Prince Paul would remain Head of State

until he was overthrown by a coup d'etat in late March 1941.
He was a Serb, but not considered to be as dedicated to the
Serb cause as the Late King was.

His ascendancy was looked

upon with hope by the Croatian population.

However, after

calling new elections, Yugoslav politics again settled into
the pattern of Serb domination and Croat passivity.
Yugoslavia was of course required to maintain foreign
relations during this period.

The main issue for Yugoslavia

was to maintain her borders, and thus security was the major
force in foreign affairs.

The Yugoslavs were surrounded by

nations seeking partitions of its territory.
and Bulgaria were the main threats.

Italy, Hungary

To counter this,

Yugoslavia "had pursued an apparently successful foreign
policy of anchoring Yugoslav security in the complementary
13
Little Entente and French alliance systems."
However,
Yugoslav policy began to change as Europe headed toward war.
I

Milan Stojadinovic , Yugoslav Prime Minister from 1935 to
1939, was the individual most responsible for this.

He

13
slowly brought Yugoslav policy more in line with the aims of
Germany and Italy.
He realized that after the Munich Crises, Yugoslav
security could not rest on its former pro-French bases.
Little Entente was dead.

The

He also realized that Yugoslav

trade was becoming more and more dominated by Germany.
/

Stojadinovie had tried to counter this growing German trade
monopoly by appealing to both Italy and Great Britain;
however, he was unsuccessful.

Great Britain was still

caught up in her own economic problems, and Italy needed
little of what Yugoslavia had to offer.

The United States

was too far away and too disinterested to create much
interest from the Yugoslavs.

Some benefits were gained by

Yugolsavia during this time, but most came from Italy and
Germany.

v

~

The Italians had kept the Ustasa bottled up on

Sardinia, and the Germans were paying top prices for
Yugoslav exports.

However, Yugoslavia had to give Italian

·claims of preeminence in Albania leeway.
In January of 1939, the Croatian Peasant Party, under
its leader Dr. Vlado Matek, met with all Croatian political
groups (excluding the Ustasa) in Zagreb.
again absent from Belgrade.

The Croats were

Macek announced at this meeting

that the Croats had not been given their rights and thus
felt no commitments towards Yugoslav policy.

He "concluded

with the ominous 'hope' that the Croats would not be
'forced' to resort to revolt and civil war in order to

14
14
realize their due rights."

This meeting was followed in

February by the sacking of Stojadinovicand the imposition
of a new government by Prince Paul.
Prince Paul appointed Dragisa Cvetkovic~as the head of
the government and Aleksandar Cincar-Markovic" as foreign
minister.

This government was given the task by Prince Paul

of bringing the Croats back into the political flow of
Yugoslav affairs.

Paul saw internal stability both as a

problem and as a necessity for his country.

This new

government quickly signed the "Sporazum" (Compromise) with
Macek and the Croats.

This returned the Croats to Belgrade

and to complete participation in the government.

Although

the Sporazum brought the Croats back into the government,
it did very little to actually unite the country.
With the country at least superficially united, the
Yugoslavs faced the task of determining their political
future within Europe.

Yugoslavia was, except in the South,

now completely surrounded by Axis powers--which were, for
the most part, unfriendly.

Yugoslavia had also been witness

to sweeping German victories in Poland and France.

The

Yugoslav government knew that its army, even if fully
united (which it was not), had no chance against Germany.
The Yugoslavs were now faced with a choice as to whether to
join the Tripartite Pact or not.
This crisis in Yugoslav foreign policy finally drew the
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attention of the two remaining great Western powers, Great
Britain and the United States.

They worked together with

Great Britain taking the lead, but the United States no less
concerned, in trying to prevent Yugoslavia's signing of the
Tripartite Pact.

This was the beginning of American

involvement in Yugoslavia (see Chapter II) during the Second
World War.

The United States would remain in contact with

the Yugoslav government in varying degrees throughout the
remainder of the War.
American policy would develop first as an adjunct of
the British and finally as a response to American needs.
The United States was diplomatically active in Yugoslavia
before the latter was overthrown.

It would be less active

after Yugoslavia's defeat, but would always encourage
Yugoslav resistance.

The United States would have little

contact with Yugoslavia until late 1943, when America again
began to study the Yugoslav situation.

The United States

would follow the British example and make contacts with the
Yugoslavs.

Unfortunately, by this time even the limited

amount of pre-War knowledge the United States had obtained
was worthless.

Yugoslavia was changing, and the United

States had to come to terms with a different and dynamic
situation.
The United States maintained diplomatic relations with
the Yugoslav government in exile, but was also very
concerned with the events then occurring inside Yugoslavia.

16

The emergence/discovery of the Yugoslav civil war and of the

two main resistance movements within the country were new
factors with which the United States had to come to grips.
~

The problems of a Serb resistance movement under Draza
MihailoviC"and a communist movement under the leadership of
Josip Broz Tito created much discussion within the
government.

u. s.

The eventual emergence of Tito as ruler and

leader of Yugoslavia was a problem for the United States,
one with which it had trouble dealing.
The United States would eventually recognize the Tito
regime, but only after it was determined to be the actual
power within the country.

Even then debate was strong about

attempting to change the situation.

But American war aims

in the Pacific and the reluctance to become involved in the
Balkans created the acceptance of the new Yugoslavia.

CHAPTER 2
1941

In early 1941, Yugoslavia found itself in a very
hostile environment.

The Germans were victorious

throughout Europe, Austria, Czechoslovakia, western Poland,
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
France--all were made a part of Hitler's empire.
Yugoslavia's neighbors were allied to Germany through
various pacts.

Austria to the north was an integral part of

the German nation and no longer existed independently;
Bulgaria and Hungary were both members of the Tripartite
Pact and, along with western neighbor Italy, were glancing
at Yugoslavia with expectations of future acquisitions.
Italy had already made itself ruler of Albania and
confronted Yugoslavia in both the far north and the
southwest, not to mention the Italian cities on the
Dalmatian coast of Yugoslavia.

Rumania, a former Yugoslav

ally, had also become a member of the Tripartite Pact.

Only

Greece, Yugoslavia's neighbor to the south, was not a member
of the pact, nor could it be expected to attack Yugoslavia.
The two remaining Western powers, Great Britain and the

18

United States, were now anxious to help Yugoslavia.

The

United States was at this time not directly involved in the
war, but ties with Great Britain were becoming much
stronger.

The American government had no illusions about

Hitler and was working, however cautiously, for a German
defeat.

Great Britain had already seen considerable action

against the Germans and was looking to gain any type of
advantage it could against Germany.

Thus, British hopes

turned to the Balkans as Great Britain tried to ally itself
1

with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.
The Yugoslav government and its leader Prince Paul
were under great pressure.

The Germans were beginning to

become adamant about Yugoslavia's accession to the
Tripartite Pact.

On the other hand, Great Britain, with

active American support, was trying to prevent any type of
Yugoslav-German agreement.

The Yugoslavs had declared their

neutrality when the war finally broke out on September 3.
This was viewed differently by the two camps competing for
Yugoslavia's favor.
To the Western Allies this was represented as a
temporary expedient, necessitated by the country's
military unpreparedness and exposed position, but
not the product of any doubts as to the outcome of
the war, while to the Axis powers it was portrayed
as the best guarantee of their preeminent economic
and political interests in the region--to the
former, neutrality with a mask1 to the latter as a
neutrality with a tilt.2

19
Both sides had advantages in gaining Yugoslavia's
favor.

The strongest position belonged to the Germans.

Germany had been Yugoslavia's largest trading partner for
years, and German armies had swept all foes before them.
This, of course, included the British, whose prestige had
naturally suffered in Yugoslavia because of its failure to
halt the German drives in France and Poland.

The British

and the Americans were, on the other hand, viewed as
Yugoslavia's natural allies.

The United States was known by

many Yugoslavs as a home for its people.

These Yugoslavs,

regardless of ethnic background, put pressure on their
former homeland.
Hundreds of telegrams were sent to the Yugoslav
government from Croatians, Serbs, and Slovenes from
throughout the United States and Canada urging Yugoslavia to
stand firm against German demands.

It was reported that

groups representing over 300,000 Yugoslavs in America were
urgently requesting Yugoslavia to stand fast.

The President

of the Supreme Council of the Serb National Federation, Simo
Werlinich, had written Prince Paul and Cvetkovic" urging
Yugoslavia to stand against the barbarians and once again to
3
def end their land in the name of freedom.
Winston Churchill, although heavily involved, realized
the position of Prince Paul.
sympathetically:

He wrote somewhat

20

In the face of it, Prince Paul's attitude looks
like that of an unfortunate man in a cage with a

tiger [Hitler], hoping not to provoke him while
steadily dinner-time approaches.4

Arthur Bliss Lane also showed his understanding of the
Yugoslav situation.

He wrote to the Secretary of State from

Belgrade on on February 14, 1941:
As to Yugoslavia and Turkey he [Prince Paul] said
that we do not intend to enter war, yet
unofficially we advise small countries to resist.
I replied that if the United States were threatened
with invasion, we would certainly resist and that
we are not suggesting to Yugoslavia or any other
country to take offensive action.5
Yugoslavia was also at this time of considerable
importance to the press.

The fighting in January, 1941 had

slowed considerably as Germany was consolidating and
preparing for future moves.

This brought the focus of the

press on Yugoslavia and Greece, the most logical places for
Germany's next move.

The press wrote at some length about

internal Yugoslav politics.

It was pointed out on many

occasions that Yugoslavia, though united for the moment,
suffered from internal ethnic frictions.

Yugoslavia was
6

reported as the "Sweden of southeastern Europe."

The New

York Times put much emphasis on a speech given by German
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.
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Yugoslavia always will be a neighbor of the Reich,
and she will therefore always remain economically
tied to Germany. From that, political cooperation
must inevitably follow.7
As can be seen from the above, Yugoslavia's position
was realized, if not appreciated, in the West.

Regardless,

the United States and Great Britain began an intensive
campaign to keep Yugoslavia out of the German camp.

This

campaign was carried on through normal diplomatic channels,
but enlisted, as the need arose, the highest personages in
both Great Britain and the United States.

The British, who

had entered the war and were still involved in almost daily
combat with the Germans were the first to become actively
involved with the Yugoslavs.

Great Britain established the

Special Operations Executive (SOE) in July of 1940.

Its aim

was to aid British foreign policy through covert activities.
Recognizing the importance of Serbia within Yugoslavia, the
SOE spent most of its energy in that part of the country.
It did, however, maintain contacts throughout Yugoslavia.
Mark Wheeler described the purpose of the SOE as a secret
service
designed to reinforce the work of diplomats,
creating by the use of subsidies, bribes, and
propaganda, a pro-British climate of opinion in
Yugoslavia (and especially in Serbia) that would
make it difficult for Prince Paul and his ministers
to knuckle under to the Axis.a
The British would spare no efforts in trying to prevent

22

Yugoslavia's joining of the Tripartite Pact.

The British felt that Prince Paul would be very
susceptible to their blandishments.

He was fluent in

English an had received his college training in England at
Oxford.

He had also been known for his pro-British views

within Yugoslavia.

He had sought British economic and

diplomatic aid for Yugoslavia in the mid-Thirties, but was
now in a much different position due to Germany's present
strength.
The British were husbanding their military resources
very closely and were unable to give any military aid to
Yugoslavia.

They did, however, try to encourage the

Yugoslavs by other means.

King George VI wrote Prince Paul

encouraging his anti-German sympathies for the first time on
july 3, 1940.

The King would later follow with additional

correspondence, but never was able to offer Prince Paul
anything concrete.

British policy was aimed at impressing

the Yugoslavs with her growing strength and absolute faith
in an ultimate victory for Great Britain.
The British by March 1941 had committed combat units in
Greece and were in a frantic search to bolster their
position.

The British position depended on Yugoslavia

agreeing to fight the Germans.

"The whole defense of
9

Salonika depended on their [Yugoslavia's] coming in."

The

British, and Churchill in particular, put great credence in
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Yugoslav arms.

The Serb army in the First World War had

fought brilliantly, and a repeat was expected in 1941.

The

British expected Yugoslavia to help stabilize and support
them in Greece, but saw other immediate missions for the
Yugoslav Army.

Churchill wrote that an attack by Yugoslavia

on the Italians could " • • • produce an Italian disaster of
the first magnitude, possibly decisive on the whole Balkan
10
situation."
The British position became even more frantic when it
learned of Germany's ultimatum to Prince Paul on March 26,
1941.

Churchill instructed the British minister in

Belgrade, Ronald Ian Campbell thusly:
Do not let any gap grow up between you and Prince
Paul or ministers. Continue to pester, nag, and
bite. Demand audiences. Don't take No for an
answer. Cling on them, pointing out Germans are
already taking the subjugation of the country for
granted. This is not time for reproaches or
dignified farewells. Meanwhile, at the same time,
do not neglect any alternative to which we may have
to resort if we find present Governments have gone
beyond recall.11
Churchill had previously telegraphed Cvetkovic', but believed
now that it was too late to expect the Yugoslav government
not to sign the Pact.
The British government had decided earlier that
although it could not materially aid Yugoslavia in its
present situation, it could offer other inducements.
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Despite Britain's (and America's) express policy of
not discussing postwar territorial settlements, the

War Cabinet considered that 'the decision of the
Yugoslav government at the prsent juncture is of
such importance that it would be worthwhile to
disregard this rule on this occasion if by doing so
we could induce Yugoslavia to intervene forcibly on
behalf of Greece.' The Foreign Secretary was
authorized on 3 March to open to the Yugoslavs the
prospect of territorial revisions if this appeared
likely to encourage them 'to throw in their lot
with us'.12
The British had by now seen little prospect in changing
Yugoslavia's course and began to seriously think of other
possibilities.

" • • • SOE's objective 'inevitably changed

from that of endeavoring to influence the government to that
13

of endeavoring to bring down the government'."

Anthony

Eden, British Foreign Secretary, telegraphed Campbell in
Belgrade on March 24:
• • • 'Prince Paul's attitude shows such a
hopeless sense of unreality that there is nothing
to be expected of him.' He empowered the Minister
'now to proceed at your own discretion by any means
at your disposal to move leaders and public opinion
to understanding realities and to action to meet
the situation • • • • You have my full authority for
any such measures that you think it right to take
to further change of government or regime, even by
coup d'etat.'
The next day, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact.
The United States during this time frame was also
diplomatically active in Yugoslavia.

Although not actively

engaged in the war like the British, the Americans had a
very similar policy.

This, of course, was to prevent
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Yugoslav accession to the Tripartite Pact.

American

activities and actions were closely parallel and
complementary to those of the British.

However, only

Britain was at war with Germany and only Britain had combat
troops in the Balkans.
President Roosevelt's fireside chat of December 29 1940
is a good starting point to trace American relations with
Yugoslavia.

This speech declared that the United States

would become the "arsenal of democracy" and that America
would stand beside its British ally.

The speech was

discussed in Yugoslavia and gave the American and British
position some additional weight.

It is of course even more

important to notice that the entire speech was not published
in the Yugoslav press.

"

[Yugoslav] Foreign Office had

eliminated passages which they thought might be offensive to
15
Hitler."
It was the American policy to keep the Yugoslavs from
signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany.

Lane, the

American Minister in Belgrade, was the individual most
responsible for pressing American positions and beliefs on
the Yugoslav government.

He was assisted in January 1941 by

a visit of Colonel William J. Donovan.
He explained to them the established United States
policy of giving every possible assistance short of
war to countries willing to fight for their
independence.16
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Donovan was on a special mission for Roosevelt trying to

ascertain Yugoslavia's position.

The United States was now
17

watching Yugoslav developments "with great concern."
Lane explained the American attitude towards Yugoslav
accession to the Tripartite Pact to Yugoslav Foreign
~

Minister Alexander Cincar-Markovic on February 9:
I expressed my personal opinion that countries that
do not resist aggression are not worthy of
independence and need not count on our support when
political and geographic readjustments are made
after the war • • • that we are committed to full
support of all people who resist aggression. I
believe even at this late hour in present critical
situations in Balkans the result would be
salutary.18
I

A week after Lane's meeting with Cincar-Markovic, he
wrote Washington about his discussion on February 18 with
Prince Paul.

Prince Paul again outlined Yugoslavia's

position in Europe and the great strength of Germany.
He said even if the United States helped him
Yugoslavia would be finished before our assistance
arrived and the country would be destroyed in the
meantime.19
Regardless of these opinions, pressure continued to be
placed on Prince Paul.
The United States, like Great Britain, was not above
having the Chief of State send personal messages to the
Yugoslav Head of State.

Roosevelt sent a personal message

to Prince Paul on February 22.
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I am addressing this message to Your Royal Highness

with a view to emphasizing the interest of the
United States in the outcome of the war.
I fully
appreciate the difficult and vital problems facing
you and the Yugoslav government, but I most
earnestly wish to point out that the United States
is looking not merely to the present but to the
future. I wish to convey to you my feeling that the
world in general regards with very real sympathy
any nation which resists attack, both military or
diplomatic, by the predatory powers.20
The Yugoslav internal situation was by now being
closely watched in the press.

Yugoslavia was described by

The New York Times on January 18, 1941 as Germany's debtor.
The Yugoslav government had been purchasing huge amounts of
war materials, and her balance of trade with Germany was
deeply out of balance.

The ability to pay for this debt was

viewed as dim at best.

This was a change in Yugoslav

economic relations vis-a-vis Germany, which had since 1934
always showed a surplus in favor of Yugoslavia.

As

previously mentioned, this gave the Germans added confidence
in their dealings with Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslavs had also been described as indebted to
the Germans for helping keep Yugoslav resistance/separatist
movements under some control.

Now, however, the press was

describing more fully Yugoslav government actions against
Croat separatists and terrorists.

Yugoslavia was shown to

be deeply divided, and for the first time, in economic
jeopardy to a foreign power.

Also by this time Yugoslavia's
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geographic isolation was fully appreciated by even the most
casual observer of Yugoslav events.
By March 1941, it had become apparent to both the
United States government and the press that events would
soon take their own course in Yugoslavia.

Secretary of

State Cordell Hull wrote Roosevelt concerning events in
Yugoslavia on March 12, 1941.

He reminded the President

that the American government had been in almost constant
touch with the nonaligned Balkan states.

Hull stated that

the United States had made its position on aiding Britain
and any other nation resisting foreign domination.

It was

stressed time and again that the "vast resources" of the
United States would be used to supply these nations.

Hull

believed that he and his representatives had done
~verything

in their power to bolster the morale of the

Balkan nations (Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia).

He was

able to point out that he had constantly sought out
suggestions from these lands as to how the United States
could best support them.

Hull remarked that the

representatives only requested one additional thing and that
was the actual stationing of large numbers of combat troops
with sufficient material aid to help stop any German
21
thrust.
Even before Hull's message to the President, events in
Yugoslavia were beginning to move even faster.

The New York
-----

Times reported on March 5 that Yugoslavia had ordered full
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mobilization.

It was stated that Yugoslavia would have
22

1,000,000 men in the field by March 21.

Opposition

leaders in Yugoslavia were also reported to have decided
that "any kind of paper with Germany will mean the immediate
downfall of the [Yugoslav] government, revolt in the army
and spontaneous rebellion throughout the country • • • "

The

article added " • • • such declaration must be naturally
23

viewed with extreme caution."

The paper was also

describing the activities of Lane at this moment as
24

"extraordinarily active."
On March 14, the National Bank of Yugoslavia sent a
request to the American Secretary of the Treasury, that
Yugoslav gold reserves in the United States be removed from
the United States.

This amounted to $22 million, and the

request was immediately sent over to the Secretary of State.
Hull saw no valid reasons for the Yugoslav request and
delayed any answer.
they were.

However, the funds would remain where

The opinion of Hull was that the funds were

already in a safe place and that the United States would use
25
them only to further Yugoslav interests.
Lane telegraphed Washington twice, once on March 16 and
again on March 19, warning the State Department that
Yugoslavia was about to sign the Tripartite Pact.

These

notes prompted a meeting between Sumner Welles, Acting
Secretary of State, and Constantine Fotid, Yugoslav Minister
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to the United States.

Welles explained to Fotid that if

Yugoslavia signed the Pact, public opinion in the United
States would be outraged and all Yugoslav assets in this
country would be frozen as well as the chance for any
24

American aid for Yugoslavia.

Welles followed this meeting

by sending instructions to Lane for transmittal of this
message to the Yugoslav government.
Lane met Prince Paul on the 20th of March and outlined
the American position.

He told the Prince of Italy's poor

position in Albania, British naval successes against Italy
in the Adriatic and Mediterranean and of British landings
and troop reinforcements on the Greek mainland.

He again

told him of America's and President Roosevelt's wish for
Yugoslavia to remain outside the Tripartite Pact.
The United States, as long as Yugoslavia retains
her entire independence and freedom of action in
defense of her own territory, is prepared to offer
all facilities under the Lend-Lease Bill which is
now law, and finally in accordance with the terms
of the message recently sent you in that regard,
those Yugoslav assets which are now on deposit in
the United States will remain at her disposal as
long as in the interpretation of this government
Yugoslavia remains a free and independent
country.27
Lane sent a message to the Secretary of State in which he
described Prince Paul as unswayed by the American agreement.
Lane would meet frequently for the next couple of days
the Yugoslav government officials trying to sway them away
from signing the Tripartite Pact.

,

I

He met Cvetkovic on the
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22nd of March, who said that Yugoslavia would soon sign the

pact.

~

Cvetkovic termed Lane's arguments as

not very strong. He lamely explained that
Yugoslavia's adherence should not be regarded as a
move against us or Britain. The Pact is purely
political, not military.
I said [Lane], I am sure
action would have most unfavorable effect in United
States where Yugoslav courage has been a
tradition.28
On March 23, 1941, The New York Times revealed that

The Yugoslav government committed itself tonight to
enter the Axis orbit despite grave fears that the
step might cause civil war. Mass resignations -Of
high officials opposed to the alliance and uneasy
friction in the army ranks were grave
manifestations of the violent and growing internal
descent.29
In spite of ali efforts by British and American
officials, the Yugoslavs signed the Tripartite Pact on the
25th of March.
reaction.

The signing of the Pact set off a chain

The American and British governments were very

upset at the news, and the press termed Yugoslavia's signing
of the Pact as "surrender and capitualtion."

The next day,

the United States government through an Executive Order
froze all Yugoslav assets.

Sumner Welles at a press

conference announced that the United States had been
working for weeks trying to prevent Yugoslavia's signature.
He also explained why Yugoslav assets had been frozen
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• • • since the primary purpose of this government
was to preserve the assets held in the United

States for the peoples of the countries that had
fallen into the Nazi orbit. That was the basis on
which steps were taken in every instance.30
Events in Yugoslavia took another turn on the 27th of
March.

A coup d'etat in Belgrade overthrew the government

of Prince Paul and the Regency.

The coup led by Air

Force General Du~an Simovid'immediately placed King Peter on
the throne but did not repudiate the signing of the
Tripartite Pact with Germany.

The coup was viewed with

instantaneous approval, both in the United States and
especially in Great Gritain.
The coup in Belgrade was basically a Serbian affair.
Althugh both the Americans and the British were against the
Pact and worked accordingly, their influence was nominal.
There have been some arguments by British historians about
SOE's importance or lack of importance in helping to create
the coup.

However, available evidence indicates that it was

an internal Yugoslav event, led almost entirely by Serbs.
No realistic Yugoslav could have really expected much aid
from either of the democracies, although some did expect it.
There is no doubt that most Yugoslavs found it much easier
to be aligned with the United States and Great Britain, but
that the efforts of these two countries had only nominal
effect on the actions of the Yugoslav officers.
Churchill was elated by the news of the coup and
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exclaimed that the Yugoslav nation "had found her soul."

He

wrote that "The news of the revolution in Belgrade naturally
31

gave us great satisfaction."

He immediately wished to

send the Foreign Secretary to Belgrade for talks, but this
request was refused by the Yugoslavs, who did not wish to
offend Hitler.

However, Field Marshall John Dill, Commander

of the Imperial General Staff, was sent to Belgrade.
Dill arrived in Belgrade to try to coordinate the
movements of the Yugoslav and Greek armies.

He also pushed

for an immediate Yugoslav attack on the Italian positions in
Albania.

Dill was disappointed in his discussions in

Belgrade and believed the Yugoslavs showed " • • • failure to
appreciate the immediacy of his [Simovic's] country's
32

peril."

The Yugoslavs in turn were very surprised at the

lack of British power in Greece.
The United States reacted differently from the

British~

and direct military discussions, such as those Dill
attempted with SimoviC', did not come into question.
The Acting Secretary of State, Welles, instructed Lane to
meet with the new Yugoslav government as soon as possible.
• • • and state in the name of your government
that the news which has reached this country of the
constitution of the new government under the King
and General Simovic has created the immediate
popular reactioan that this event constitutes a
matter of self-congratulation for every libertyloving man and woman.

34

You are further authorized to state that in
accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease
Bill, the President, in the interest of the

national defense of the United States, is enabled
to provide assistance to Yugoslavia, like all
others nations which are seeking to maintain their
independence and integrity and to repel
aggression.33
President Roosevelt on the next day (March 28) sent a
telegram to King Peter.

This was a personal message to the

young King offering support and best wishes from the
President.
Lane was informed from Washington on March 28, that the
United States government had never withdrawn recognition
from the monarchy and that nothing was required now to
34

recognize the new Yugoslav Government.

Lane met with

General Simovit on March 28 and explained to him that
America
• • • had never urged on previous governments such
a move [offensive action against Germany] and my
efforts had been solely to prevent Yugoslavia from
relinquishing her independence.35
The next day, Lane met with the new Yugoslav Foreign
Minister, Mom~ilo Nin~ic', who requested that Yugoslav assets
in the United States be frozen.

Moreover, events would

again direct the American response, and Nin~ic's question
went unanswered.
The reaction by the general public in the United States
had been very favorable to the Yugoslav coup.

The New York

35

Times was very strong in its praise for the Yugoslav action.
The paper printed a long editorial in the March 28th
edition, praising Yugoslavia.

The sensational coup was

compared to a lightening flash against a dark horizon.

The

Yugoslavs were well organized and were the first to show the
world what the peoples of Europe really thought of Hitler.
The King was described as riding through the streets of
Belgrade as the populace rose up in wild celebration and the
army prepared for the defense of the border.

The paper

termed the coup as "epoch-making" and was probably organized
and abetted with British help.

The Yugoslavs were described

as ready to def end their land to the end and the paper said
that the nation's true feelings were out in the open for all
to see.

It spoke of the Americans of Yugoslav descent who
36

had been relieved and overjoyed by Yugoslavia's action.
The reactions were unanimously favorable in both
Britain and the United States; however, with these reactions
came heightened expectations of Yugoslav action.

As already

mentioned, the British had sent General Dill to Belgrade for
military talks with Yugoslavia.

The British officer left

frustrated and disappointed, but this was not known by the
press.

c.

L. Sulzberger wrote that "overnight the Balkan

balance has been astonishingly changed by the dramatic
Yugoslav coup, which reinforces Allied positions on the
37
Continent."
The papers were full of articles describing
Yugoslavia's million man army and the country's long history

36

of military battles.

Yugoslav soldiers were described as
38

having "the reputation of being the best in the world."
The population was described as "bellicose" and "committed
39
to war."
The New York Times was consistent in its praises for
the Yugoslav army, usually, as seen above, sparing no
adjectives in its descriptions.

Articles pointed out that

Yugoslav terrain was ideal for a prolonged resistance.
Yugoslavia was described as having approximately 18 firstline divisions and a total army of 32 divisions.

These

divisions, although short in artillery, were expected to
accomplish much and soon.

The paper wrote on a couple of

occasions that it expected Yugoslavia to attack the Italians
in Albania and gain easy victories there (March 31 and April
1) •
Even Lane's reports seemed more optimistic than before.
He described his March 31 meeting with King Peter very
favorably.

He wrote the Secretary of State:

"His show of

moral courage • • • and his evident desire to rely on the
United States give me great hope for his future and for that
40
of his country."
Yugoslavia was invaded on April 6 , 1941 by Germany,
Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

The reaction in Great Britain

and the United States was swift.
this action of Nazi aggression.

Both countries deplored
Cordell Hull stated:
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The barbaric invasion of Yugoslavia and the attempt
to annihilate that country by brute force is but

another chapter in the present planned movement of
attempted world conquest • • • 41
The Secretary of State added in a message delivered in
Belgrade by Lane to the Yugoslav government:
The American people have the greatest sympathy for
the nation which has been so outrageously attacked,
and we follow closely the valiant struggle the
Yugoslav people are making to protect their homes
and preserve their liberty.
This government, with its policy of helping those
who are defending themselves against would-be
conquerors, is now proceeding as speedily as
possible to send military and other supplies to
Yugoslavia.42
This message was followed on April 8 by a personal
message from Roosevelt to King Peter encouraging Yugoslav
resistance.

Roosevelt sent "his most earnest hopes for a

successful resistance to this criminal assault upon the
43

independence and integrity of your country."
Attempts on the part of private individuals and
associations to aid Yugoslavia were not slow in developing.
The American Red Cross announced on April 7 that it was
prepared to send $1,000,000 in medical and relief supplies
to Yugoslavia immediately.

Prominent members of New York

business and society also announced efforts to assist
Yugoslavia.

This last group would later develop into the

Organization of the American Friends of Yugoslavia.
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However, it soon became apparent that the Yugoslav Army was
in desperate trouble, and aid from any outside source would
not reach Yugoslavia for months.
Roosevelt applied the Neutrality Act to Yugoslavia on
April 12, 1941, effectively stifling all American aid to
Yugoslavia.

The Neutrality Act of 1939 was established to

prevent the United States from becoming involved in
conflict.

It was noted, however, that Roosevelt did not

apply the Neutrality Act to Yugoslavia until it was obvious
44
Yugoslavia
that Yugoslavia could not resist much longer.
collapsed on April 17, 1941, and surrendered to the Germans.
With the defeat, Yugoslavia was immediately divided by
the victors.

Serbia was greatly reduced and placed under

rigid German control.

Croatia was elevated to an

independent country by both the Germans and the Italians and
~

was governed by Dr. Ante Pavelic and his U~ta~e upon their
return to the country, with the invaders.

Slovenia was

incorporated directly into Germany and Italy and was
therefore given no status at all.

Yugoslavia was also faced

with occupation armies from Hungary in the north and
Bulgaria in the Macedonian region.
The quick and easy defeat of Yugoslavia came as a shock
to both the United States and Great Britain, but the
immediate public reaction came from the press.

Yugoslavia

was once described as a military power, but was now
described as being disunited and militarily unprepared to
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(

meet the invasion.

Yugoslavia was not slow to take a back

seat in the minds of Americans.

It would never again

achieve the status with either the American government or

J

the people that it had enjoyed following the coup.
For the remainder of 1941, the American government
would have limited contact with the Yugoslav government.

Lane, the last American representative in Yugoslavia, left
the country on May 16.

There were, however, several

meetings in Washington between the State Department and the
Yugoslav Ambassador FotiC.

Foticprotested on several

occasions about the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and was
assured by the American government that the partitions of
Yugoslavia were not recognized by the United States.

The

American entrance into the war on December 7, 1941, would
place Yugoslav issues far back on the scale of priorities
for the United States.

It would be many months before the

United States would begin to be active in Yugoslav affairs.
The previously-mentioned Organization of the American

1

Friends of Yugoslavia was founded on May 21, 1942, and it
did keep the issue of Yugoslavia in the public eye from time
to time.

This group included the Governor of New York,

Wendell L. Wilkie; the Presidents of Yale, Johns Hopkins,
and Occidental College (Hamilton Fish Armstrong); and the
Presidents of the Chase Manhattan Bank and International
Business Machines (IBM).

This organization would not act
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independently, but turn over its fund to the Red Cross for
distribution in Yugoslavia.

The organization was declared

to be " • • • a tangible demonstration of the affection and
esteem which the American nation has for the Yugoslav
45

people."
Organization of the American Friends of Yugoslavia held
a "gala" affair in New York on September 6, 1941.

Speeches

were made over a national radio hook-up on the CBS Radio
Network.

~

King Peter and General Simovic spoke via short

wave radio to this group (and to the entire nation) from
London.

The Yugoslavs were again cited for their courage,

and a message from Roosevelt to King Peter was read.

CHAPTER 3
1942
Events in Yugoslavia were unknown to the outside world
for months after German forces overran the country.
However, activity was not slow in developing outside and
within the country.

Survivors of the Yugoslav Army went into

the hills with their weapons and began to plan a resistance
movement against the invaders.

Outside the country, members

of the Yugoslav government led by the King reestablished
their government.

The groups inside the country would be

led by a former member of the Yugoslav General Staff,
Colonel Draza MihailoviC:

Mihailovic~and his group, who

were predominantly Serbian, began coordinating resistance
efforts in Bosnia and Serbia by the middle of May 1941.
v

This group was soon labelled the Cetniks, a term used by
Serbian resistance fighters since their struggles for
1

independence against Turkey in the early 19th century.

The

~

Cetniks would remain the official Yugoslav military
representatives in the country for the future and would
attempt to stay in contact with the Yugoslav government in
exile.
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The second resistance group was slower in entering the
war but did so in July of 1941.

This group was called the

Partisans and was led by Josip Broz (Tito).

Tito was head

of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and the most important
Partisan leadership was Communist.

Tito himself had been

placed at the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1939
by Moscow,. which he visited on a few occasions during the
period between the two world wars.

The Communist Party had

been outlawed in Yugoslavia since August 9, 1921.

This

created a very small and close-knit organization that was
used to functioning under clerks.

It was, however, not

without experienced military leaders, as many Yugoslav
Communists had fought in the Spanish Civil War.

The

~

Partisans, like the Cetniks, went into the mountainous areas
of Bosnia.
Initially, there was some minor cooperation between the
two resistance groups, and Tito and Mihailovic did meet
twice during October 1941.

The last formal meeting between

the two groups was on November 19, 1941, but neither
Mihailovid nor Tito participated in that gathering.

The two

groups developed different beliefs regarding the best way to
defend Yugoslavia.

The Cetniks thought it best to organize

and prepare for the eventual defeat of Germany and spare the
country the massive reprisals of the Germans.

Tito's

followers were more interested in attacking and fighting the
Germans.
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The two movements also had different political arms.
The Cetniks were, for the most part, loyal members of the
Yugoslav Army and wished to preserve the pre-war Yugoslavia.
This was not the case with the Partisans, who were
considered outlaws and part of an illegal organization.
Their goal was to create a socialist Yugoslavia, and they
had no wish to preserve the pre-war Yugoslavia.
The Partisans were revolutionaries, the Cetniks
were for the restoration of the status quo. The
Partisans appealed to the broad masses of all
Yugoslavia, but the Cetniks restricted their
appeal, with minor exceptions, to the Serbs.2
These different political aims quickly caused the two groups
to become suspicious of each other; and by 1941, they would,
in fact, be in many instances more interested in fighting
each other than in fighting their country's invaders.
The existence of resistance within Yugoslavia became
known to the United States and Great Britain by the summer
of 1941.

However, the actual conditions within the country

were unknown, and any discussion of the resistance by either
the United States or Great Britain naturally would be
~

centered on the Cetniks.

~

This was normal, as the Cetniks

represented the Yugoslav government, which by January 11,
~

1942 was led by then-Brigadier General Mihailovic, who was
appointed Yugoslav Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force.

Tito and the Communists, on the other hand, were
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virtually unknown and controlled no sources of power or
persuasion outside of Yugoslavia.

Although fragile,

Yugoslav resistance to Nazi domination attracted British and
later American interest.
The first Allied mission arrived in Yugoslavia on
September 20, 1941.

This was a four-man group led by

British Captain D. T. (Bill) Hudson, who parachuted into
Montenegro (Crna Gora) with a radio and three Montenegrin
soldiers.

Hudson's mission was "to contact, investigate and

report on all groups offering resistance to the enemy,
3

regardless of race, creed, or political persuasion."
Hudson would meet both Tito and Mihailovi~ while in
Yugoslavia, but for the most part he spent his time alone.
Hudson was soon followed by other British missions, but
information was still very scarce on actual events within
Yugoslavia.
During the next several months, the intermittent
nature of communications with Mihailovic, the
failure to establish other intelligence missions
• • • and the absence of any overwhelming military
interest caused the British to relegate Yugoslav
resistance to a very secondary importance.4
It is important to note that the British began sending
missions into Yugoslavia with Hudson in September of 1941,
but the Americans did not send their first mission into the
country until August of 1943, and then only as a part of the
larger British mission already established.

There was,
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however, contact between the American and Yugoslav
governments continuously during this time frame.

But any

American knowledge of events in Yugoslavia had to come from
non-American sources.

For the most part, American

information and interaction with with Yugoslavia came from

,

the Yugoslav Minister in Washington, Fotic.
;

Fotic himself became a source of some problems for the
American government.*

He was, however, reaffirmed as the

recognized representative of the Royal Yugoslav government
on February 13, 1942.

A message from Sumner Welles also

reiterated American recognition of the Yugoslav government.

.,

The United States sent Fotic another note on April 22, 1942
in response to Yugoslav descriptions of events in
Yugoslavia.
The government and people of the United States
have watched with admiration the resourceful and
heroic operations of General Mihajlovic
[Mihailovic] and his men and are proud to
acknowledge the contribution of Yugoslav patriots in
the common struggle against the forces bent on the
destruction of free nations throughout the world.6
The most important event in Yugoslav-American relations
during 1942 took place from June 22 to July 29 when King
Peter visited the United States.

The King was accompanied

by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mom~ilo Nincic.
*

He

Fotid"'was a strong supporter of Serbia and was extremely
anti-Communist and, to a lesser extent, anti-Croat. His
reports to the American government were colored by his
"Pan Serb" beliefs.
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received all the honors of a visiting head of state when

Secretary of State Cordell Hull escorted him from
Washington's Union Station to the White House where he spent
the night of June 24, 1942.

Here conversations were held

with Roosevelt and other members of the American government
as well as with Churchill, who was also a guest in
Washington at this time.
The King described his conversation as follows:
Our discussion that evening mainly concerned the
extent to which the United States could help
Yugoslavia in sending supplies to Mihailovich
[Mihailovic] and his Chetniks [Cetniks]. Roosevelt
pointed out that he was severely pressed just then
• • • • Nevertheless the President stressed his
sympathy for the Yugoslav patriots • • • • 7
The King spent a total of seven days in Washington on his
"official" visit and met most of the senior members of the
Unitd States government.

He spoke on June 25 to a joint

session of Congress and later that day visited the American
Red Cross Headquarters and the National Press Club.
The King also met with members of Yugoslav
organizations in the United States and attended luncheons by
the Organization of American Friends of Yugoslavia in both
Washington and New York.

In New York, he also spoke over

the NBC Radio Network to the entire American nation.

The

King also toured the American heavy industry belt from
Detroit to Buffalo before returning to Washington on July 24.
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He again held meetings with Roosevelt, and they issued
a joint statement which read in part:
We are in complete accord on the fundamental
principle that all our resources of the two nations
should be devoted to the vigorous prosecution of
the war; that like the fine achievement of General
Mihailovich [Mihailovic] and his daring men, an
example of spontaneous and unselfish will to
victory, our common effort shall seek every means
to defeat the enemies of all free nations.a
The King left the country with more than feelings of
good will.

The United States and Yugoslavia signed a Lend-

Lease Agreement on July 24.

The King wrote "So everything

was cordial when, in July of 1942, I left the White House in
9

Washington after conferring with President Roosevelt •

"

On August 3, Roosevelt wrote the King a personal note
wherein he also was very positive about the visit.
Your Majesty's visit was a personal pleasure which
I shall long remember. It gave also to the
American people an opportunity to do honor to the
valiant Yugoslav people in their noble and
unceasing fight for the liberation of their
country.10
Following the King's visit, the United States began to
receive more information on events within Yugoslavia.

This

information would create the atmosphere for YugoslavAmerican relations for months in the future.

The primary

source for American knowledge of internal affairs in
Yugoslavia came from Yugoslav sources, again primarily
~

.., "

Ambassador Fotic and Foreign Minister Nincic.
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For the most part, official Yugoslav sources were
telling the American government that events in Yugoslavia

were very confused.

However, they always stressed the

accomplishments of Mihailovic, both political and military,
and described the atrocities and terrorist methods of the
Partisans/Communists, as well as the number of Serbs being
butchered by the Ustasa in Croatia.

Ninci~ said that by

September 1942, over 600,000 Serbs had been murdered and
v

~

over 300,000 had fled the Ustasa.

He also was bitter about

the press in the United States which seemed to lack proper
knowledge of Mihailovi~'s valiant efforts.

Nintic"' (as well

as other members of the Yugoslav government--Foti~ ·in
particular) described the Partisans as "a collection of
international criminals, most of them brought in from
12
abroad."
The Communists were usually described as doing
virtually no fighting compared with Mihailovi~'s ceaseless
efforts against the invaders.
The various Serb, Croat, and Slovene periodicals in the
United States began to write articles about events in
Yugoslavia.

The Serbs were accusing the Croats of

atrocities, and the Croats were calling the Serbs liars.
This issue prompted Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A.
Berle, Jr. to speak before the editors of the Yugoslav
foreign language press in America.

He made statements to

the group concerning the Yugoslav issues to the effect
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that we had no interest in these various
controversies since we believed that the war had to
be won by united American'effort, and that these
people ought to get together as Americans and leave

their European differenaces over.
He also said
that while we had no interest ~n the politics of
General Mihailovicz [Mihailovic] , so long as he was
fighting the Germans we were for him, and that up
to that date we had no information leading us to
believe that he was doing anything but fight[ing]
Germans.13
Later, Berle would call this squabble in the Yugoslav press
14
in America "a danger to the American war effort."
It should be stated that the American government also
was receiving some information about Yugoslavia from other
sources and these seemed to contradict the stories of
I

Communist atrocities and Mihailovic's reputation as a
crusading warrior.

Sumner Welles wrote to Ambassador Foti6

(the Yugoslav mission was raised to the status of an Embassy
on September 29, 1942):
Reports indicate that ,the conflict between
Mihajlovic [Mihailovic] forces and the Communist
partisans in Yugoslavia may become a matter of
serious concern • • • •
He added that:
• • • certain British circles have become
mistrustful of Mihajlovic [Mihailovic] and tolerant
of the partisan faction.15

50

The British had by the summer of 1942 begun to
/

reevaluate Mihailovic.

They had not dropped their support

for him, but began to gather evidence about his inactivity
and political leanings.
described as "Pan Serb."

These have been accurately
From inside Yugoslavia, Hudson

sent a message to the Foreign Office on September 6, 1942,
~

stating that Mihailovic had not fought the Germans since
December 1941 and that it appeared that the Partisans were
16
far more important in the war effort in Yugoslavia.
The
British had also noticed through their study of Axis press
releases the paucity of information on Mihailovic compared
with frequent mention of Communist activities.

However,

Francis Biddle, Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in
Exile, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on October
7, 1942, writing that
neither Yugoslav circles nor I know of any British
circles who have become either tolerant of the
'Partisan' faction or mistrustful of Mihailovic.17
Biddle also wrote messages describing the lack of unity
in the Yugoslav Government in Exile.

He was worried about

the internal frictions that were expanding between the
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Croats and Serbs.*

He believed that post-war unity was in

jeopardy and felt that the Serbs could not liberalize their
views and create a Yugoslavia of equal opportunity for all
18
Biddle became increasingly concerned about
ethnic groups.
Yugoslav politics and described the King as being surrounded
by politicians from a different world who allowed the King
19
very little leeway in liberalizing Yugoslav polity.
The Secretary of State instructed Biddle on December
30, 1942, that he should continue to encourage unity within
the Yugoslav government.

Hull wrote that "The disputes

between the Serb and Croatian elements in the United States
. 20

have had a deplorable effect on our national unity."

He

was worried because the issue had begun to spread from just
the Yugoslav-Americans to the general public.

The feeling

at the State Department was that the Yugoslav Government in
I

Exile and its Minister in the United States, Fotic, were
increasing these problems through lack of a firm and wellunderstood policy.

The Secretary placed special emphasis on

Fotic's role as he gained support from the Pan Serb
* Pre-war Serb-Croat internal problems became worse
during the war. Croatia was now dominant in Yugoslavia
and had· infuriated the Serbs through a policy of terrorism
inside the country. Serbia was subject to a very harsh
German rule, and the Government in Exile was dominated by
the Serbs. These Serbs were sure of the Croatian
atro.cities and considered most Croats traitors. The
Croats in the Government in Exile thought Serbian charges
were greatly exaggerated and fought as before the war to
secure more freedom/power for Croatia.
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elements.

The fact that this had stirred up controversy in

the American press was also upsetting.
Regardless of American misgivings, on December 31,
•

I

1942, the State Department sent Ambassador Fotic a message,
signed by Sumner Welles, which once again reaffirmed
official American support for Mihailovid. It described
,,,
Mihailovic as a skillful and energetic Yugoslav patriot who
continued the "noble struggle" against Yugoslavia's
21
oppressors.
Walter Roberts summed up the American position in
Yugoslavia at the end of 1942 in a very succinct manner.
For the United States, Yugoslavia was at that time
a distant country, the geography of which had only
a limited significance in the pursuit of the war.
America regretted the existence of a civil war,
and since it recognized the Yugoslav-Government-inExile as the only legal government, it felt duly
bound to support it and its commander in
Yugoslavia, General Mihailovic.22

CHAPTER IV
1943
On January 1, 1943, the United States government,
through its European Field Commander, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, sent a note to General Mihailovid.

This note

followed a recommendation sent by the Secretary of State to
Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War.*

In it, Eisenhower

congratulated and praised Mihailovic' and called Mihailovib 1 s
soldiers "immortal warriors" who "serve the common cause of
the United Nations."

He also wished his Yugoslav comrades
1

in arms "every success."

This was the first direct message
2

between the American government and Mihailovid.
Although the United States government started 1943 by
/

its direct recognition of Mihailovic, American actions in
Yugoslavia continued on their rather silent course as
established in 1942.

The United States continued to learn

or hear of events inside Yugoslavia from secondary sources,

*

Hull requested that this be done because the United
States had never directly recognized Mihailovid. They
felt it would be most appropriate if it were handled
through military channels, especially since the British
had already accomplished this. See FROS '41, vol II,
p.840.
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as before these sources were the British and the Yugoslav
governments.

The State Department was concerned with what

the British were doing in Yugoslavia, and the Department
became increasingly concerned about the Yugoslav civil war.
Yugoslav events became better known in general in the United
States, and this created controversy regarding the actual
leaders of the resistance in Yugoslavia.

The Partisans

became more important, and support for them and critiques of
.
.
. *' flared up in the American press.
M1ha1lov1c

The press

became more literate about events in Yugoslavia, and papers
like the Daily Worker became impressed with the Partisans.
The most significant American move came in the summer of
1943 when American liaison officers were sent to both the
v

Cetniks (August 18) and the Partisans (August 22).

Thus,

direct American involvement in Yugoslavia was established
for he first time since May 16, 1941.
The importance of British policy in Yugoslavia cannot
be underrated, especially compared with American lack of
activity.

First, as previously described, the British began
~

to lose enthusiasm for Mihailovic as they gained respect for
the Partisans.

The British missions in the field had

relayed as frequently as possible their findings to London.
Wheeler wrote:

"During the first third of 1943, the

Partisans won the Yugoslav civil war and the British decided
3
to contact and assist them."
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Churchill himself began to get reinvolved in Yugoslav
affairs at this time.

He held a dinner party for King

Peter and his mother in December of 1942, and matters
concerning the resistance of Yugoslavia were discussed.

Two

days later Eden would dine with the King and the Queen

,,

mother, and direct hints about Mihailovic's failures were
4

brought forth.

This led, on January 3, 1943, the Yugoslav

Prime Minister, who was changing his cabinet, to ask the
/

British whether they still supported Mihailovic.

Slobodan

Jovanovic, Yugoslav Premier, was told that there was at this
, 5
time no reason to remove Mihailovic.
The British decided in February to send their first
missions to the Partisans.

These missions parachuted into

areas of suspected Partisan activity, and on May 28, 1943,
Captain F.

w.

Deakin was taken to Partisan headquarters

where he met Tito.

Deakin's mission, codenamed "Typical,"

was the most important.

He was a personal friend of

Churchill, and his reports would carry great weight in
London.

His arrival during heavy fighting between the

Partisans and the Germans led Deakin to assert firmly that
the Partisans were a centrally-organized and well-led force
6

which should be deemed worthy of British support.
Deakin, himself, wrote in The Embattled Mountain that
by July 1943, the Prime Minister had
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by personal intervention • • • determined • • • the
forces of Tito now emerged as the leading movement
of resistance in an area in which he was acquiring
an immediate and strategic interest."7
Churchill wrote:
There was much to be said for supporting Tito, who
was holding a number of German divisions and doing
much more for the Allied cause than the Chetniks
[Cetniks] under Mihailovic.8
The Chiefs of Staff reported to Churchill on June 6,
1943, that Mihailovi~ had been "hopelessly compromised."
They stated that clear information to the War Office (from
the growing number of British soldiers within Yugoslavia)
had shown Mihailovicto be a collaborationist in both
Hercegovinia and Montenegro.

There was no question that it
v
was the Partisans and not the Cetniks who had been occupying
9

the activities of the Axis.

The Foreign Office also

/

determined that Mihailovic was too "anti-Communist, antiMoslem, and anti-Croat" to be of any use in helping settle
10
political issues in postwar Yugoslavia.
Churchill termed
Mihailovi~a "major obstacle" and was determined to persuade

the King to remove him as Minister of War.

Churchill ordered
I

the withdraw! of his missions operating in Mihailovic's
territory and the removal of official support for him by the
11
British government in December of 1943.
Churchill wrote that it had become apparent that the
12
Partisans were the future rulers of Yugoslavia.
He
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therefore sent a message to the Foreign Secretary on
December 9, 1943, outlining British policy for Yugoslavia.
He wanted first
the immediate repudiation of Mihailovic by His
Majesty's government and if possible King Peter
• • • and to explore what advantage may be gained
for the King from the new situation that will be
created upon his dismissal of Mihailovic.13
Churchill concluded that the King's chances of retaining his
throne were greatly enhanced by having Mihailovicremoved.
To almost all of these events the American government
was little more than a concerned observer.

Even when

American liaison officers were finally in the field " •
it was clear, however, that the British were the senior
14
partners in this enterprise."
Regardless of this
situation, the United States became more involved in
Yugoslavia throughout 1943.
The immediate concerns of the State Department in
January of 1943 were the problems of one Yugoslav government
and of the growing civil war within the country.

Biddle

wrote the Secretary of State several times in January
describing his discussions with various Yugoslav
politicians.

Biddle stated that the Yugoslav cabinet was in

a crisis over the political direction or lack of direction
it gave MihailoviC:

He also was quick to point out that

Croat/U~ta~a atrocities against the Serbs allowed for little
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flexibility among the various factions of the Yugoslav
15
government.
This inflexibility led to Nin~ic's removal as

Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister's assuming this role
also.
On January 2, 1943, Jovanovic and Biddle discussed
Yugoslav-American relations, and Biddle told " • • • that the
most important point to stress, both for the government here
[London] and for the Embassy in the United States, was the
16
establishment of unity."
Biddle also told Jovanovi6 that
there was nothing the American government could do
concerning the growing attacks against Mihailovi6 by various
sectors of the American press.
H. Freeman Matthews, American Charge in the United
Kingdom, wrote the Secretary of State on February 24, 1943,
from London concerning British policy in Yugoslavia.
Matthews reiterated the British support for Mihailovid;
however, he also pointed out some of the British
government's misgivings.

He reported that the British had,

in fact, sent very little aid to Mihailovici and that their
I

agents inside Yugoslavia had reported Mihailovic's lack of
aggressiveness against his country's invaders.

Matthews

v

also reported that the Cetniks were reported to have
attacked the Partisans, and finally that the British
government had decided to contact the Partisans.

This was

in line with the British policy of aiding anyone willing to
17
fight the Axis.
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By the end of March 1943, the American government

received a clear indication of growing British uneasiness
with Mihailovic.

The Foreign Office showed Biddle a note it

was sending to the Yugoslav government concerning
Mihailovic.

The British had been offended by a recent

speech of Mihailovic's, which accused them of holding the
Yugoslav government prisoner.

He also said that he would

fight the Germans but not until he had dealt with the
v

~

Ustase, Croats, and Moslems.

The Americans also wrote that

the Yugoslav government was now split among the two Serbian
factions:

Pan Serb and and Pan Yugoslav.

It was hoped
18

again that the Yugoslavs would soon form a united front.
On April 16, 1943, the Yugoslav Embassy sent a long
message to the State Department.

This was another in a

series of messages in which the Yugoslav Government in Exile

,

defended itself and the actions of General Mihailovic.

It

was a brief historical sketch of events in war-ravaged
Yugoslavia and an attack against the Communists within the
country.

It is most interesting because it is the first

time the name Tito is found in State Department records.

He

is described by the Yugoslav government as "purely or partly
19
foreign." Thus, the name Tito is introduced in State

*Tito was, in fact, born in Croatia to a Croatian father and
a Slovenian mother. His real name was Josip Broz, but
Tito became recognized as part of his name. He was
officially known as Josip Broz Tito.
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Department files by a foreign-authored note months after
British representatives had held face-to-face talks with
him.
Yugoslavia was not a topic of much discussion in the
popular press, although as previously mentioned, it became a
heated topic in various ethnic newspapers within the United
States.

By early 1943, the Yugoslav civil war had made its

appearance in the mainstream press, and issues concerning
Yugoslavia gained some importance.

c.

L. Sulzberger wrote

about "the necessity of cleaning up the dreary Yugoslav
20
situation as soon as possible."
The New York Times
published an editorial on February 5, 1943, discussing the
increasing resistance efforts inside Yugoslavia.

It termed

Yugoslavia the most "open" and " dangerous" of Hitler's
territories.

The paper was distressed by Yugoslavia's lack

of internal cohesion and wrote that the two resistance
groups were receiving support from different groups.

It was

stated that the Russians were supporting the Partisans, and
the Yugoslav Government in Exile the C~tniks.
New York City once again began holding events of
importance in support of Yugoslavia.

Mayor Fiorello H.

LaGuardia, a former American Consul in Yugoslavia, headed a
major event sponsored to bring about Yugoslav unity.

Held

at the Metropolitan Opera House, it featured Zinka Kunc
Milanov, a Croat, in the leading role of Aida.

Milanov was

married to a Serb, and a Yugoslav Victory Rally was held at
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intermission and broadcast over a nationwide radio network.
Other events including inter-faith religious services were
also held throughout the country in honor of Yugoslavia's
resistance.
Ambassador Fotic met with President Roosevelt on May 5,
1943, after his return from London.

Foti6 wrote that
/

Roosevelt said he had not been influenced by anti-Mihailovic
propaganda and wanted to know what he could do to help
Yugoslavia and prevent the spread of the Yugoslav civil war.
The President was reported to be excited about Italy's
approaching def eat and the growing importance of the
guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia.

Foti6 wrote that he felt

the United States should send officers into Yugoslavia to
21

observe events there for themselves.
Roosevelt has been quoted during the early part of 1943
as wondering whether Yugoslavia should return to its pre-war
boundaries following the war's conclusion.

He speculated to

Foti~ that if the Croats would be retained in Yugoslavia

after the war, " • • • the Croats had taken a way different
from that of the Serbs, and their future appeared to him to
22

be 'cloudy'."

Roberts stated that Roosevelt had

expressed much the same thought to British Foreign Secretary
Eden on March 14, 1943.
• • • The President expressed his oft-repeated
opinion that the Croats and Serbs had nothing in
common and that it is ridiculous to try to force
two such antagonistic peoples to live together
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under one government.

The State Department appeared not to put much credence
in Roosevelt's pronouncements, and these statements were not
found in the Foreign Relations of the United States.

The

Department did write a long memorandum on Yugoslav affairs
on May 1.

Its author was Cavendish

Division of European Affairs.

w.

Cannon, Head of the

Cannon covered what he

believed to be a summation of American knowledge of
Yugoslavia at this time.

His first few points were

regarding Mihailovic, whose exploits he termed as greatly
exaggerated.

He also remarked that he had, in fact, been

doing very little fighting and probably had been cooperating
with the Italians against the Partisans, but that there was
no concrete evidence of collaboration with the Germans.

The

memorandum stated that the British officers with Mihailovic
were at odds with him and probably were not objective in
their reports.

It was also noted that Britain controlled

Mihailovib's communications and that he had received very
few supplies from them.
The Partisans, Cannon wrote, had been having a tough
time recently and were probably not as dominated by the
Communists as the State Department previously thought.

He

also reported that the Soviet government was still denying
any influence or control of the Partisans, that Partisan
attempts at forming governments had been a failure and that
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Mihailovic must also have political elements with him, but
these were unknown (although he wrote that they must have
24
been established to counter the Partisans).
The State Department was asked by the British in midMay whether the United States would be interested in sending
American officers into Yugoslavia.

Cannon wrote that the

Department had not been interested when Foti6 had suggested
this, but it might be different now.

However, the Department

recommended against sending any Americans at that time.
Cannon believed advantages could be gained by this move, but
25

that the United States should wait.

It was believed that

Americans in Yugoslavia would enable the State Department to
more efficiently interpret Yugoslav events.
On July 6, 1943, the British Embassy in Washington sent
an "Aide Memoire" to the Department of State.

This was an

official announcement that the British had decided to give
qualified aid to the Partisans as well as its continuation
to General Mihailovic.
The summer of 1943 brought two important events in
American consideration of Yugoslavia.

The first was the

arrival of American liaison officers in Yugoslavia in
August.

An American officer was attached to Mihailovic on

August 18, and four days later an American officer reached
Partisan headquarters.

The United States had its first

official representatives in Yugoslavia since May 1941.
second event was the surrender of Italy on September 8,

The
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1943.
The Italian surrender had been expected by both sides
and led to actions by all the parties within Yugoslavia.
v

The Partisans and Cetniks disarmed as many Italian soliders
as possible, with the Partisans gaining substantial material
reinforcements and territorial gains.

The Germans were

forced to send additional troops into Yugoslavia to try to
fill the gap left by the Italians.

The Germans spent the

next several months recapturing the Adriatic coast from the
Partisans, but the number of Axis troops and their
effectiveness were not as great as before the Italian
surrender.
The major diplomatic question concerning the Italian
defeat had already been broached by the Yugoslav Foreign
~inister,

Milan Grol, in July.

Grol requested that

Yugoslavia be allowed to incorporate former Italian enclaves
26

on the Yugoslav Adriatic coast into Yugoslavia.

The State

Department took note of this request, but maintained the
American policy of not giving territorial concessions until
after the end of hostilities.
In October 1943, the first American correspondent
reached Yugoslavia.

This was Associated Press' Daniel De

Luce, who was quick to report on American aid being shipped
into Yugoslavia from Italy.

He reported direct American

involvement as well as the treatment of thousands of
27

Partisan wounded in American hospitals in Italy.
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The fall of 1943 saw Yugoslavia return as an important

topic in the American press.

Papers were now more familiar

with the Yugoslav civil war, and Tito began to supplant
Mihailovic as the most frequently cited and important leader
of the resistance in Yugoslavia.

De Luce reported on

October 9 that he "found not one scrap of evidence of
28

Partisan terror.

The New York Times wrote that the

fighting was very confused but that the civil war was not as
29
serious as previously thought.
This paper, in an
editorial on October 20, asked the development of an
American policy for Yugoslavia and wrote about the necessity
30

for unifying the resistance movements there.

Tito was

cited by The New York Times for his heavy fighting and
contrasted with the lack of effort made by Mihailovic.
31
Mihailovi6 1 s activity was termed as "somewhat puzzling."

c.

L. Sulzberger wrote that Mihailovic had reported

capturing the southern Yugoslav part of Boka Kotorska.

He

also reported that he had been unable to find anything to
~

substantiate Mihailovic's claim.

This report was one of the

first written by a non-ethnic writer in America questioning
the abilities and accomplishments of Mihailovic.

Sulzberger

also wrote that the Yugoslav civil war between Mihailovic
32

and Tito was "expanding."
As previously stated, the American military was now
becoming active in Yugoslavia.

The Office of Strategic
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Services (OSS) had started shipping large quantities of
supplies from Bari, Italy into Yugoslavia over the Adriatic
on October 15.

It shipped over 6,000 tons of supplies and

brought over 12,000 Partisan wounded to hospitals in Italy
33
This support would continue for the
during October.
remainder of the war.
Major Linn M. Farish, United States Army, sent his
first report as American Liaison Officer to the Partisans
out of the country on October 29, 1943.

His report was the

first from an American in an official position in Yugoslavia
in over two years.

Farish wrote that "the Partisan movement

is of far greater military and political importance than is
commonly realized in the outside world."

He also wrote that

the Partisans had created their position with virtually no
outside assistance and that, although Communist-led, it was
not totally dominated by them.

Farish believed that all

members of the Partisans should be allowed to express their
views and that it was a democratic organization.

He wrote

~

that he had seen with his own eyes Cetnik attacks on the
Partisans and was very adamant in considering Mihailovic
politically and militarily irresponsible.

Finally, Farish

asked for much greater aid for the Partisans, whom he
characterized as carrying on a struggle "at times beyond
34
imagination."
Two political events of major importance to
Yugoslavia occurred in November.

The first was the Tehran
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Conference of November 27 through December 2, 1943.

This

meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin was to establish
strategic plans for the defeat of Germany1 and Yugoslavia
was not infrequently mentioned.

Although not of much

significance in the global context, the "Big Three" had
decided to give additional support to the Balkans.

Stalin

stated that he believed too much emphasis was being placed
on Yugoslavia and that the number of Axis divisions being
tied up by Yugoslav guerillas was greatly exaggerated.

He

also said of Yugoslavia "the Soviets do not think, however,
35
that this is an important matter."
The second major political event was held by the
Partisans inside Yugoslavia at Jajce on November 29.

This

conference outlined Partisan political views and goals.
most important of these were:

The

the unilateral transfer of

power from the Yugoslav Government in Exile to the National
Committee of Liberation (the political arm of the
Partisans)1 the exclusion of King Peter from Yugoslavia
until the people expressed their wishes1 and the appointment
of Tito as Marshal of Yugoslavia.

No American was present

at this meeting, and it would be some time before it was to
create a stir in Yugoslavia's international position.
The United States learned of the events in Jajce from
its Ambassador in the Soviet Union,

w.

Averill Harriman, who

sent an outline of events to the Secretary of State on
December 14.

Harriman received his information from a
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Soviet government agency, which also announced that the
Soviet Union would soon be sending a military mission to
36
A more complete description of the
Partisan headquarters.
"Jajce Declaration" was sent by the new Ambassador to the
Yugoslav Government in Exile, Lincoln MacVeagh (appointed on
November 12) on December 28, 1943.

The American Ambassador

in the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, reported that the
British government had now put a halt to any policy
decisions regarding Yugoslavia as a direct result of the
37

Jajce Declaration.

The British were about ready to ask

King Peter to drop Mihailovic from his cabinet, but this was
now temporarily blocked.
The Secretary of State gave MacVeagh instructions
regarding how he should handle the events following the
Jayce Declaration.

Hull wrote that the resistance movements

were of "undoubled military value", that they should
continue to expand their energies in the war against the
Germans, and that the United States would not enter into any
political discussions with them.

He finished his

instructions by writing "In line with our consistent policy,
we consider that political arrangements are primarily a
38

matter for future choice of the Yugoslav people."

These

statements of Hull's were also published in the American
press.
Louis Adamic, leader of the United Committee of South
Slavic Americans and a member of the American Slav Congress,
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came out publicly for strong support by the United States
for Tito.

He asked for immediate recognition of Tito's

39
provisional government.

He also reported that he believed

that the Government in Exile was pro-Fascist and did not
deserve American support.

For these statements, Adamic and

the organizations he represented were labeled Communist
40

fronts.

Events that were previously reserved for the

Yugoslav foreign language press within the United States had
been entering the popular press for months.

Ruth Mitchell,

sister of Air Force General William "Billy" Mitchell, had
written in July about the anti-Serb and Mihailovic press.
She wrote that it was the Communists and Croats who were
41
defaming Mihailovi~ and his efforts.
1943 ended with the Americans once again involved with
Yugoslavia.

Although the United States was not as active as

Great Britain, it did begin to learn first-hand about
Yugoslav events.

The American people also began to read and

hear about events in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was once again

described as fighting in the mainstream of the war.

Tito

and his Partisans were described most favorably on December
22, 1943, in an editorial in The New York Times.
It is an epic deal of heroism and daring, of
sacrifice, suffering and death, which place it on a
level with the most heroic chapters of this war.42
The United States had sent its first liaison mission
into Yugoslavia during 1943 and had also recognized the
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importance of Tito and the Partisans.

The United States

would help Tito for military reasons, but would not discuss

any political relationships in Yugoslavia until the end of
the war.

CHAPTER V

1944
1944 was much like 1943 in that events concerning
Yugoslavia were dominated by the British.

The British led

sometimes with Russian concurrence, and the Americans
formulated their stance on Yugoslav issues by the actions of
the other powers, but usually in reaction to the British.
However, American knowledge of Yugoslav events was greater
now~

and through the press, the American public was kept

constantly informed of British machinations regarding
Yugoslav politics.

The three most important events in

Yugoslav affairs at this time, outside the military sphere,
were dominated by the British.
The first event was the return of King Peter and his
Government in Exile from Cairo to London.

It was also
I

responsible for the eventual dismissal of the Puric

government (along with its Minister of Defense Mihailovic)'
and the establishment pf the new government headed by the
.
"'
..,, "
f ormer Ban o f Croat1a,
Dr Ivan Subasic.

The second event

was the removal of military missions from Mihailovid, both
V'

·British and American.

I

The third event was the Tito-Subasic
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Agreement of November 1.

The United States played little

role in events one and three, and simply followed the

British military mission out of Mihailovic's headquarters.
The United States would, however, keep an American officer
~

with Mihailovic, but only as an intelligence mission and not
an official military representative of the American
government.
Churchill himself wrote Tito in response to a get-well
message he had received from him.

Churchill had been

cautioned by the Foreign Office, and Eden in particular,
that personal correspondence with Tito might not be a good
idea, but Churchill's first letter to Tito was sent on
January 8, 1944.

In response to Eden's caution, Churchill

wrote:
I have been convinced by the arguments of men I
know and trust Mihailovic [ 1 ] is a millstone tied
around the neck of the little King, and he has no
chance till he gets rid of him.1
Churchill wrote Tito that
I am resolved that the British government shall
give no further military support to Mihailovic [']
and will only give help to you.2
He also wrote that he considered it a good idea for the
I

Royal Yugoslav government to dismiss Mihailovic from its
Cabinet.

Churchill wrote favorably about the King and

stated that British relations with him would be maintained.
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Churchill, of course, flattered Tito on his "valiant effort"
and the hope that all the resistance forces in Yugoslavia

would soon be united.

The Prime Minister added that his

son would soon be joining Tito in the field.
The King, who had been staying with his government,
flew back to London in early March for a series of meetings
and political discussions with the British.

Churchill had

by this time continued his correspondence with Tito.
wrote him again on February 5.

He

He told Tito that he could

understand his lack of enthusiasm for the King, but that he
was personally responsible and wished to have the King
dismiss Mihailovicfrom his government.

Churchill also

wanted to know what effect the King's dismissal of
Mihailovic' and his possible return to his homeland would have
on Tito.

Churchill acknowledged that he realized the final

determination of the monarchy would not be done until the
final liberation of the country.

The Prime Minister also

wrote that a working arrangement between the King and Tito
could have significant benefit for Tito and would allow the
country to speak with a united voice.

Churchill ended his

letter by stating that it was his Britannic Majesty's
government's desire to unite all patriotic forces behind
Tito and to help in forming a united and federative
3
democracy in Yugoslavia.
Tito replied to Churchill as in the first letter--with
very guarded words.

Tito would not commit himself to any
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actions.

Churchill again wrote Tito on February 25 and

repeated his wish for the King to dismiss Mihailovic' and, if
possible, return to Yugoslavia.
Churchill also went before the House of Commons on
February 22 and spoke about the general war situation and
also about Yugoslavia in particular.

During this speech he
I

publicly gave his support to Tito and berated Mihailovic for
"being left alone in certain mountain areas and in return
4

doing nothing or very little against the enemy."

He

,

contrasted Mihailovic with the Partisan's continuous
struggles against the Germans and told how the Partisans
were made up of all Yugoslav ethnic groups, unlike the Serb
~

Cetniks.

He stated "Of course the Partisans of Marshal Tito

are the only people doing any effective fighting against the
Germans now."

Churchill also said that every effort was

being made to aid Tito.
commented:

In reference to the King, he

"We cannot dis-associate ourselves in any way

from him," although he suffers in the eyes of the Partisans
5
because of his association with Mihailovi~.
The State Department closely followed British actions
in Yugoslavia.

However, America remained a bystander and

waited to see how events would turn.

Still much information

was discussed in relation to American policy towards
Yugoslavia, but most of it was in response to British
initiatives.

By January 17, 1944, the State Department had
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been informed of the Foreign Office's wish to have

,

6

Mihailovic removed from the Yugoslav government.

The

Americans realized that this would strengthen the King visa-vis his relations with Tito and the Partisans.
The United States never interfered with British moves,
but remained cautious and somewhat cynical of them.

British

policy towards Yugoslavia was termed "trial and error," and
the United States should "not want to commit ourselves to a
definite stand on the British, at least until we know Tito's
7
reaction to the Churchill letter."
This came from a State
Department memorandum of January 19, 1944.

This memorandum

continued at length discussing British reasons for ·dropping
support for Mihailovic~

It also brought into focus the

• I
probability of the downfall of the Pur1c
government that

I

would be caused by the King's removal of Mihailovic.
The memorandum stated:
• • • it would be unfortunate and dangerous for
this government to become politically involved
otherwise than in rather general terms with an
internal situation as difficult as this.
It continued by pointing out that the United States must act
in concert with both the British and the Soviets.

It stated

that the Royal Yugoslav governments were dominated by PanSerb "intransigence" and that unless the United States had a
policy which it wished to work very had to support, it would

"

be best to throw our weight in the direction of the
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moderate and democratically-minded elements who look to the
future rather than the past," the conclusion being that
continued support for Serb-dominated governments appeared
fruitless, but that there might be other choices than to
support Tito.
Ambassador MacVeagh wrote the Secretary of State about
Churchill's letter to Tito and emphasized Churchill's wish
I

for Mihailovic's removal.

MacVeagh also hinted for

,

continued American support for Mihailovic.

MacVeagh again

wrote the Secretary of State on February 21, telling him
that the British would soon remove their liaison officers
I

from Mihailovic and that it was recommended that the
American liaison officers be removed at the same time.

,

At

this time, the American military mission to Mihailovic
~onsisted

of three officers, with only the most junior, Lt.
I

Muselin, still remaining with Mihailovic.

The British were

asking that he be removed as an act of joint BritishAmerican military policy.

Muselin would remain with

Mihailovid, but the other officers were permanently pulled
out under orders from British General Maitland Wilson,
8
Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean.
Muselin's
mission, however, was changed; he was no longer a liaison
officer, but an intelligence officer of "an independent,
purely intelligence mission composed of a single American
9

officer."

This action was approved by the State Department

on March 2, 1944.
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The Soviet Union began to draw attention to itself with

respect to Yugoslavia.

The Soviets refused to sign a treaty

with the Royal Yugoslav Government during January 1944.

The

New York Times wrote on February 6, that the Soviet Union
favored Tito and the National Liberation Movement.

It also

wrote that Mihailovi~was termed a "pro-Fascist" by the
Soviets.

They printed the Soviet response to the proposed

treaty with Yugoslavia.

The Soviets stated that " • • • the

uncertainty of the situation in Yugoslavia" prvented them
from signing any treaty.

The Soviety Military Mission

finally arrived at Tito's headquarters on February 23, 1944.
The Soviets had announced at the Tehran Conference that they
would be sending such a mission.

The Russian mission was

much larger than the British and American missions combined
and carried a more prestigious officer at its head, Lt.
General N. V. Korneyev.
Stettinius wrote a memorandum from London in which he
placed much emphasis on the Russians.

He wrote:

The important factor in the Yugoslav situation
today is not so much the Tito-Mihailovic-Cairo
conflict as the interplay of Soviet and British
policy in question.10
He wrote that the Soviet Union had continued to attack
Mihailovic and was openly pro-Tito.

However, it was

maintaining proper relations with respect to the King.

He

was also pointed out that Tito had received no military aid
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from the Soviets that the Americans knew of.

Stettinius

ended his brief discussion of the Soviets by adding that
they "have thus far kept formally correct relations with the
11
Government in Exile."
The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, MacVeagh, had
12
already termed Churchill's policy as "pro-Tito"
Stettinius wrote from London about what he thought the
British were trying to accomplish in their current talks
I

with the King and Prime Minister Puric.

He wrote that

Churchill had added his "immense personal prestige" to the
side of Tito.

He pointed out how he was corresponding with

him directly; he also pointed out the fact that his son was
now assigned to Tito's headquarters.

Stettinius wrote that

the political discussions then occurring in London were to
change the makeup of the Yugoslav government--that the King

,

,

would still be its leader, but that Mihailovic and Puric
would be dropped to allow elements of the Partisans to form
a united government.

He also accused the British of

competing with the Russians for Yugoslavia's favor while
describing the Russians as only mildly interested in
Yugoslav events.
In closing, Stettinius summarized the official American
position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia.

He indicated that America

would continue to send aid to Tito for military purposes and
that our rcognition of the Government in Exile would
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continue, although he noted its weaknesses.

He said that we

would maintain a liaison mission with Tito and a single-

member intelligence mission with Mihailovic!.

He also said

that Tito was trying to acquire the frozen Yugoslav assets
in America, which would not be available to him without
political recognition.

He concluded that the United States

would continued.to deal with any orderly, established
13

Yugoslav government.
News of America's lack of activity in Yugoslavia was
published in The New York Times editorial of May 1, 1944.
The paper described American policy as adhering to the
Atlantic Charter, while leaving policy determination in the
Balkans to the British.

The editorial accused the British

of creating a political vacuum and of aiding the rise of
Marshal Tito.

c.

L. Sulzberger, a writer for The New York

Times and son of the publisher, wrote that "the State
Department has made it clear more than once that in any type
of active diplomacy, the Eastern Mediterranean remain
14
essentially a British sphere of interest."
Regardless of American activity or lack of it, the King
and his Prime Minister, Puric', were still in London holding
meetings with Churchill and lesser members of the British
government.

The King was being urged to form a new

government, one that would give him some leeway with the
Partisans.

Churchill was losing patience as both Puric' and

the King refused to dismiss Mihailovid and form a new
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government.

Churchill wrote Eden "Unless he [King Peter]

acts promptly, as the sense of your minutes indicates, his
chance of regaining his throne, in my opinion, will be

15
lost."

King Peter wrote that he had tried to convince

Churhill that to support Tito would mean a Communist
Yugoslavia.

Peter wrote that Churchill was only interested

in·defeating the "Hun."

He stated that he was being pushed

to the utmost limit to remove the Puri~ government.

Peter

reported that he was being pushed by Churchill to accept Dr.
Ivan Subasic as his new Prime Minister, a man he was assured
by Churchill would be loyal to him.

The King wrote

Roosevelt in hopes of obtaining American assistance for his
16
position, but Roosevelt made no attempt to aid him.
The American Ambassador to Great Britain, John. G.
Winant, wrote the Secretary of State.

He described the

tremendous pressure being applied to Peter to rid himself of
his government.

He discussed Britain's policy as coming for

the short run military victory and therefore unable to
support Mihailovi~.

He finished by saying that the new

government would be a "stop-gap" arrangement for the period
17
of the war.
Roosevelt's reply to the above-mentioned request for
assistance from the King was sent on May 12.

Roosevelt

wrote that he found that the King's advisers were not
telling him of the true nature of events in Yugoslavia:
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that the Royal Government was not popular and was becoming
less so as time went on.

He also suggested that Mihailovid

should be removed from the government for political reasons,
but should be allowed to remain as a soldier in the field.
Roosevelt also pointed out that contrary to what he had been
told, the Partisans had larger forces and far greater
strength in the country than the King's ministers led him to
18
believe.
It is interesting to note that within a few days
of the above-mentioned letter Roosevelt actually wrote a
letter to Tito, but it is unknown whether this letter was
sent and it was not sent in any case as a direct message
19
between Roosevelt and Tito.
The Yugoslav government of Prime Minister Puric'was
dismissed by the King on May 24.

This event had been

previously announced by Churchill in a letter to Tito
20
written on May 17.
Tito received the following message
from Churchill on May 24:
The King has sacked Puric and Company, and I think
the Ban of Croatia [Subasic] will rally a certain
force round him. My idea is that this government
should lie quiet for a bit and let events flow on
their course. This, I think, was rather in accord
with your idea in the first telegrams exchanged.21
22
Both King Peter in his memoirs A King's Heritage
23
1
Constantin Fotic in his book The War We Lost

-----

and

attributed the downfall of the Puri~ government to the
British, and to Churchill in particular.
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A new government was appointed by King Peter on June 1.
v

,

The head of this government was Dr Ivan Subasic, former

"Ban" (Governor) of Croatia and the number two man in the
Crotian Peasant Party, behind Vlado Macek.

Subasic had been

living in the United States since November 1941 and was
called to London by the King at the urging of Churchill.
y

y

~

Subasic had spoken out in the United States against
;

Mihailovic and the Government in Exile and for Marshal
24

Tito.

Although a Croat, he was not alone in these

pronouncements.

General Du~an Simovic, leader of the

Yugoslav coup d'etat had also publicly renounced the Royal
25
Government and endorsed Tito.
Cavendish Cannon, Assistant Chief, Division of Southern
Europe Affairs, summarized American policy towards
Y?goslavia on May 19, 1944.

He opined that Yugoslavia

should be maintained in its entirety.

He stressed that the

United States would not interfere in internal Yugoslav
affairs and had no special interests in Yugoslavia.

He also

wrote that there was no resistance group within Yugoslavia
that represented all the people and that the United States
would not form a policy to work with any particular group.
He also stressed that both Great Britain and the Soviet
Union had special interests in the area.

He stated that

those governments' interests were being "implemented so
dynamically that the effect is hardly consistent with our
doctrine of non-intervention."

He concluded by adding that
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Yugoslav-Americans would help Yugoslavia rebuild, but were
26

not spokesmen for American opinion on Yugoslav issues.
The spring and summer of 1944 showed vividly the
changes that had occurred in Europe since Germany's
successes of the early war period.

The British and

Americans had cleared North Africa of the Germans1 their
armies were advancing north in Italy, capturing Rome on June
41

and the Allied second front had been established in

northwest Europe on June 6 in Normandy, France.

The Soviets

had pushed the German armies hundreds of miles westward and
would enter Poland in August.

It had become apparent that

Germany would be defeated.
To a lesser extent, events in Yugoslavia were no less
dynamic.

Although Yugoslavia had quickly succumbed to

Germany, it was not slow in organiz!ng resistance against
its foreign occupiers.

By the summer of 1944, Tito and the

Partisans had been recognized as the main resistance
elements in the country, and the Tehran Conference aid had
been given almost exclusively to them.

Political events had

also reached a stage where the main players were now
recognized and in position to complete a new regime in
Yugoslavia.
The United States had recognized its lack of major
interest in Yugoslavia and had also admitted that Great
Britain and the Soviet

Unio~

had important stakes in
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Yugoslavia and the eastern Mediterranean.

American policy

had almost always followed the British lead.

The Americans
I

moved in their liaison missions to Tito and Mihailovic after
the British, but did leave an intelligence mission with
Mihailovi~ after both liaison missions had been removed,

again after the British lead.

The British had handled the

majority of the political actions with the Government in
Exile, and it would be very hard to argue with Churchill
when he wrote Roosevelt on June 23, 1943 that Britain had
n

• informed the United States at every stage of how we

are bearing this heavy burden [Yugoslavia] which at present
27
rests mainly on us."
In June 1944, the British presented a plan for uniting
all the nationalist factions in Yugoslavia.

The British

sponsored a meeting between Tito and the Yugoslav Premier in
~

v

/

London, Subasic.

The United States was not participating in

the British proposals and was waiting on the sidelines to
try to judge how the political situation would develop.

On

June 17, 1944, the Secretary of State wrote that the State
Department had no direct contact with Subasi~ and that
virtually all his information came from British sources.

He

believed that extreme caution was necessary when viewing any
information from non-American sources, that neither the
Department nor the OSS had any fresh information about
28

political or military happenings in Yugoslavia.
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The New York Times was quicker to judge the events then
occurring.

c.

Daniel, on June 2, 1944, wrote a story in the

paper that this was perhaps the last chance the King had for
saving his throne.

He wrote that the King wished to have

all discussions of the continuation of the monarchy held in
29

abeyance until after the liberation of the country.

In

effect, however, the King seemed quite clear that he would
abide by the wishes of his countrymen.
The Secretary of State received a message dated June
30

11

which described what the Americans then knew about the

British plan.

He was told that Tito would become the
v

v

~

military commander of all Yugoslav forces and that Subasic
would have the political and civil authority.

The Americans

believed that because the discussion would take place on the
Adriatic island of Vis, which was under British control,
the time seemed excellent for the British to obtain the best
bargain possible from Tito.

The bargain was to be the

consolidation of the Yugoslav forces to be followed by more
specific talks on military, economic, and financial matters
if successful.
The meeting was already in session when the Secretary
of State finally received direct information about the
talks.

This information came from the American Consul

General in Naples, George L. Brandt, who again used
Murphy's

reports and was dispatched June 18, 1944.

On

June 15, Tito was given a letter written by Churchill
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emphasizing the importance of the various Yugoslav factions
working together, in particular those represented by the
King and Tito.

Tito was in fact talking directly with

Subasic, covering the broad spectrum of Yugoslav political
affairs, but little of substance was discussed in their
initial conversations.

There was great confidence in the

belief that Tito and Subasic would come to some political
understanding, but the subject of the King was ignored by
Tito.

Murphy concluded in his message, sent to the

Secretary of State from Naples on June 18, that the British
were confident that cooperation would be achieved between
v

Tito and Subasic.

31

Churchill wrote Roosevelt on June 23 concerning the
Tito-Subasic talks.

He wrote that

I -have also taken action to try to bring together a
union of the Tito forces with those in Serbia, and
with all adhering to the Royal Yugoslav Government,
which we both have recognized.
Churchill also wrote that he could not give up on the King,
but was still supporting his position in Yugoslavia.

He

finished his letter by stating "You have been informed at
33

every stage of how we are bearing this heavy burden."
After these initial discussions were completed, Tito
was urged to go on to Italy and confer in person with the
King, and this subject was dropped.

It must be pointed out

that Tito and the King were never to meet.

Finally Brandt
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wrote again that Tito would not meet the King and that
consideration of the monarchy would be deferred until
Yugoslavia's liberation.

It was also stated that the King

was expected to approve the Tito Subasi~ talks, regardless
of the fact that the King believed that one of Tito's
primary goals was to end the monarchy.
Arthur H. F. Schoenfeld, Charge to the Yugoslav
Government in Exile, summarized the situation by once again
emphasizing that the subject of the King and Monarchy would
wait, as well as the final organization of the Yugoslav
State.

He also wrote of several other topics.

These

included Tito's command of the Yugoslav Navy and his
requests for supplies and for a permanent military mission
in Italy.
The American position on these talks was finally
clarified by the Department of State in a message dated July
4, 1944, addressed to Schoenfeld.

He wrote that

The final goal is to further the cause of national
unity. No action should be initiated which would
commit us to recognition of any claims to the
revision of pre-war frontiers. Such questions must
be held in abeyance for settlement at the peace
conference. This means in Yugoslavia that we should
provide the fullest aid to Tito's Partisans • • • •
We must not become involved in or a party to purely
internal conflicts or domestic issues in
Yugoslavia.34
The Secretary of State received his first concrete
•

V

V" • I

information on the Tito-Subasic talks from Schoenfeld, on
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July 5.

This note was a copy of a report given to Churchill

by Subasic.

Following are the key excerpts from this

communication:
Subasic states that before reaching their
conclusions, Tito and he agreed to divide their
future into two phases, the first preparatory and
the second final • • • • • He thinks there will be
time enough to improve the position of the King,
and the new government shows themselves [sic]
prepared to do everything in their power actively
to help the people and the resisters. Tito will
then be more outspoken on the matter • • • • Subasic
adds that the recently-concluded agreement has the
following significance for the King and the
Government:
It signifies first of all recognition·
by Tito and his anti-Fascist and executive councils
of the legitimate representatives of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. This recognition is demonstrated by
the fact that Tito and his national committee have
discussed and concluded an agreement with the Royal
Government of Yugoslavia.
In addition, Tito and
his men agree to delegate two persons to the Royal
Government.35
According to Schoenfeld, the value of this document to Tito
and the Partisans was that the King accepted the principle
of a democratic and federal organization structure for the
post-war state.
America agreed with the British objective to aid
Yugoslav resistance elements, to avoid a civil war, and to
achieve Yugoslav national unity.

The British policy and the

American policy were virtually identical.

However, Hull did

not agree with all the means by which this "accord" was to
be implemented.

His main argument against it was that it

was basically an agreement between the British and Tito,
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with SubasiC' acting as a go-between.

He viewed it as an

almost unconditional approval of Partisan demands that would
most probably be forced on the King.
It was, however, believed that the appointment of
Subasic to replace Mihailovi~ as Minister of War paved the
way for negotiations leading to a reasonable arrangement
between the various Yugoslav factions.

Hull also was upset

at what he termed the exclusion of Serbian interests in the
V

v

I

negotiations between Tito and Subasic.

He stated _that the

Department was firmly against giving Tito and/or the
Partisans a free hand in Serbia, and he resented the Allies'
36
lack of knowledge concerning the events within Serbia.
The King somewhat unhappily described Churchill's
reactions to these talks as "

• content and pleased that

Tito recognized my government and showed willingness to
37

cooperate."
~

v

/

Following Subasic's return to London, the King formed a
new government, to which Tito sent his personal
representative.

The members of the new government were

divided equally among the three largest Yugoslav groups--the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes--causing Fotic to complain about
the lack of Serbian representation.

The head of the OSS,

William Donovan, wrote to the Director of the Office of
European Affairs, James

c.

Dunn, describing a discussion

between Tito and Time/Life correspondent Pribi~evi~.

In
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this article, to which Donovan appeared to give credence,
Pribi~evic described why the Partisans had carried on the
.,.

., •

I

discussions between Tito and Subasic.

The Partisans and

Tito believed it was necessary to take these steps to obtain
the necessary international recognition.

The steps were

unfortunate, but necessary to allow them to change
the political recognition regarding their status in
international affairs.
It was only a few days after the United States learned

...
" ~
of the substance of the Tito-Subasic accords that the
National Committee of Liber.ation renounced the Communist
representatives sent to London and the Royal Yugoslav
Government.

They did not consider themselves "officially"

represented in London.

H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director

of the Office of European Affairs, wrote to the Secretary of
State regarding the comments of the National Committee of
Liberation.

In it he pointed out that Tito had shown bad

faith by announcing the terms of the secret agreement and
then by allowing almost the entire text to be read on "Free
Yugoslavia," a radio station in Russia.

It was also

considered poor that after he had named representatives to
the Royal Yugoslav Government, the National Committee of
Liberation later repudiated them.

Matthews once again

stressed the Department's belief that Tito should not be
strengthened at the expense of the Serbs and finally that
American arms were being used by Tito in the Yugoslav Civil
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Perhaps the final word concerning American

War.

participation during the recent talks is best summed up by
Robert Murphy:
The conversations at Bair and Vis were restricted
to an Anglo-Yugoslav basis without American
participation, and no invitation to participate was
extended to us.40
Churchill, after corresponding with Tito, met him face
to face in Italy.

Their meeting took place on August 12,

1949, and Churchill felt that he had an excellent
opportunity to influence Tito.

Churchill hoped to increase
¥

~

I

the cooperation between Tito and Subasic and the King.
Churchill wrote that at his meeting, "Tito assured me that,
as he had stated publicly, he had no desire to introduce the
41
Communist system into Yugoslavia."
Churchill, however,
was not able to receive any commitments from Tito, but once
again took the lead in dealing with him.

Churchill did

cable Roosevelt of his talks, but the United States had
little to do with Tito's stay in Italy.
As early as August, 1944, American officials were
already concerning themselves with possible Yugoslav post-war
claims.

These, of course, concerned the regions bordering

Yugoslavia on the north and northwest, including Venezia,
Giulia, Trieste, Gorizia, and the Istrian Peninsula.
Secretary of State Hull pointed out the American position
regarding border claims in a note sent to Murphy on August
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26, 1944.

In the note, Hull pointed out that it was not the

policy of the government to recognize any claims, especially
42

at this time.
On September 12, 1944, the same day the American Army
entered Germany, King Peter issued a communique via radio
~

~

,

giving his views on the recent Tito-Subasic accords.

In

this talk, he urged all Yugoslavs to rally to the National
Liberation Army under Tito, and he also affirmed his support
for the talks.

Eight days later, the United States

appointed Richard

c.

Patterson as the new American

Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile.

Patterson

remained the American Ambassador until the end of the war
and became the first American Ambassador to the new
Yugoslavia.
Alexander

c.

Kirk,

u. s.

Political Advisor on the

staff of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theater
(SACMED), wrote to Washington in late September, 1944,
concerning the restrictions on American military personnel
within Partisan-held Yugoslavia.

He wrote that this was

because Tito did not wish the American or British
representatives to recognize or report on any of the events
in the Yugoslav civil war.

Tito was, in fact, consolidating

his power at this time.
Because the war was nearing its conclusion, Tito and
his supporters were more sure of themselves.

Their grip on
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the country was becoming more firmly established, and Tito
was using all his influence to channel Western aid to

Yugoslavia.

Tito realized that after the Germans began

evacuating Greece, which they did on October 7, 1944,
Yugoslavia's turn was approaching.

It also became known

that Tito had left Yugoslavia and flew secretly to Moscow.
There he coordinated the activities of the Soviet Army with
his Partisans for the upcoming sweep through Yugoslavia.
This trip irritated Churchill, who described the British as
Tito's protectors.

He was particularly upset at not being
43
notified in advance of the trip.
Tito, by this time,
openly considered the American intelligence mission at his
headquarters an abomination.
·An announcement by Dr. Ivan Ribnikar, President of

AVNOJ*, was reported immediately by Kirk to Washington.
Ribnikar was reported as saying that a new federal
Yugoslavia already existed, both "defacto" and "dejure,"
which had been established the previous November in the
Jacje Declarations proclaiming AVNOJ.

He also reported that

Ribnikar had said that the Partisans would allow others to
make peace with them, but no one would be allowed to deny
them the fruits of their victory.

*

AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation of
Yugoslavia) was established by Tito in Jajce during
November 1943. It was to establish and carry out
political goals for the hitherto military Partisan
movement.
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This report was viewed with alarm in Washington,
because it showed how far Tito wanted to take his power in
Yugoslavia, and it led American observers to question what
type of arrangements could be made with him in the future.
Churchill again became actively involved in Yugoslav
affairs.
In a visit to Moscow, October 9-22, 1944, Yugoslavia
was discussed with Stalin.

They divided the Balkans into

spheres of influence with each country having a 5Q/50
influence in Yugoslavia.

The United States was not a

participant in these talks and, as Churchill wrote
Roosevelt, "You may be sure we shall handle everything so as
44
not to commit you."
Churchill indicated that these were
only preliminary discussions and that no firm commitments
would be made.

He wrote:

Concerning Yugoslavia, the numerical symbol 50-50
is intended to be the foundation of joint action
and an agreed policy between the two Powers [Great
Britain and the Soviet Union] now closely involved,
so as to favor the ~reation of a united Yugoslavia
after all elements there have been joined together
to the utmost in driving out the Nazi invaders.
It
is intended to prevent, for instance, armed strife
between the Croats and Slovenes on the one side and
powerful and numerous elements in Serbia on the
other • • • 45
Churchill also believed that this arrangement afforded the
British to remain on equal footing with the Russians in
Yugoslavia.
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The Americans, as previously mentioned, saw this area as
one of unique importance to the two powers and reacted
calmly.

Roosevelt had been kept updated by both Ambassador

Harriman and Churchill of the proceedings in Moscow and
apparently made little of them.
On October 27, 1944, Churchill again brought the
subject of Yugoslavia up in a speech before the House of
Commons.

Churchill was acting again to bring Tito and

v

"" I
Subasic
together to effect changes in the situation between

the Royal Yugoslav Government and Tito in Yugoslavia.

He

mentioned that the Russians were joining the British in
support of these talks, while the Americans once again
remained on the sidelines.
Major Charles

w.

Thayer of the Independent American

Military Mission to Tito wrote from Belgrade on November 4,
1944, concerning the Tito-Subasic talks and their
agreements.

This report was of paramount importance because

it commented on the internal policies that would be followed
by the two major Yugoslav factions, Marshal Tito's National
Liberation Front and King Peter's Royal Government.

The

fulfillment of these agreements was to stabilize the
situation and eventually lead to a permanent Yugoslav
government, one which the United States must either work
with or against if it were to deal with post-World War II
Yugoslavia (see Appendix I for a full copy and attached
V

I

subagreements of the Tito Subasic Agreement, dated November
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1, 1944).

Thayer pointed out the major weakness of the

plan--the Regents named by the King must be approved by Tito
and the new combined cabinet would have a preponderance of
Tito's people over Subasic's by a 2:1 ratio.
Before his departure, Maclean stated that he felt
it was the best that could be hoped for, though he
readily admitted to its shortcomings, which he said
he would have to point out to his Prime Minister.
Since he did not believe anything Great Britain or
the United States could do would result in a more
satisfactory document, he was determined to try to
obtain quick approval by his authorities and King
Peter.
Thayer continued in the same correspondence:
Furthermore, Tito is today the only leader with any
real power within the country. His following,
whatever its relative size in proportion to the
population, is the only organized, armed and active
group in Yugoslavia. Thus, the new agreement only
legalized his position as the supreme authority in
the country. It is believed that he intends to set
up the sort of government desired by the AntiFascist Council and that the plebiscite will in all
probability be a 'take it or leave it' proposition
with no alternative but to express acceptance or
rejection of the Council's platform. Under these
conditions, the results are a foregone conclusion.46
Reactions to the Tito-~ubasic Agreement were not slow
in forming.

Perhaps the most realistic and sanguine

response to these talks came from Kirk.

He saw the

agreement as a move necessary for Tito and his followers to
gain international recognition.
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• • • Tito had given barely enough to secure
continuity and recognition. He would be Prime

Minister and Subasic merely a subservient link with
the outside world.47
The New York Times November 19, 1944, summed up the
Tito-Subasic Agreement.

The paper wrote that this agreement

~
v
'
between Tito and Subasic
was greatly assisted by Britain and

the USSR and finally cleared up years of political turmoil.
It suggested that Britain was backing the King and would be
pleased to see him return to the country, while the Soviets
backed Tito.

The King was quoted as saying that he would
48
wait for the call of his people before returning.
The King reacted much differently in private as
reported by Ambassador Patterson:
The King replied that he would not sign the
agreement, for it is tantamount to abdication. The
King said regency was only a form to gain
recognition by the United States and Britain. The
King also made comments about the possibility of
reorganizing his government and removing himself
from both Churchill's and Subasic's influence.49
Tito continued to consolidate and broaden his powers in
Yugoslavia after the agreement.

He announced a full general

amnesty to the supporters of Mihailovi~ and to members of
the Regular Croatian Army ("Domobrani").

He also published

the political make-up of the postwar Yugoslavia.

It would

be a federal state with six republics--Serbia, Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Montenegro.
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It was stated that each republic would have its own assembly
elected by the people following the complete liberation of

the country.
Churchill also reacted to this agreement, which he was
greatly responsible for helping to enact.

His infatuation

with Tito and the Partisans became far less intense, but he
~

~

I

nevertheless continued to support the Tito-Subasic
Agreement.
The new Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
finally outlined the official American policy to the TitoSubasid Agreement in a telegram to Ambassador Patterson in
London, dated December 23, 1944.
v

v

Patterson was told that he

I

could tell both Subasic and the King that the Department had
reviewed the documents and concluded that they held in form
with the principles expressed by the Royal Yugoslav
Government, both in its political and its war aims.
However, Stettinius added that the American government would
have to reserve opinion on the ability of this agreement to
be fully implemented.

It was believed that the

implementation depended upon the cooperation and respect of
the Yugoslav two factions for each other.

Patterson was

also told to emphasize that the American government had
always defended the rights of the Yugoslav peoples to form
their own government without the suppression of any group
within the country, and in particular without any foreign
influence.
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After saying that the agreement was perhaps too general
and that knowledge of pertinent subtleties in Yugoslav law
was not at hand, Stettinius continued:
For your guidance, it may be added that in the
event of the King's acceptance of this or any
compromise agreement, the question of 'recognition'
by this Government would not arise. Our formal
relations would not be determined by our appraisal
of the merits of the arrangement. Should the King
reject whatever terms may be arrived at, we
consider it probable that Marshal Tito would
formally repudiate the Government-in-Exile and
request recognition of his organization as the
responsible government.
In such circumstances, our
decision concerning recognition would depend on a
re-examination of the situation within Yugoslavia,
followed probably with consultation with other
governments with regard to the situation then
prevailing.SO
1944 came to an end with the political situation in
Yugoslavia becoming more clear.

Tito had continued to

consolidate his political strength and had been recognized
by the King as the military leader for the entire country.
~

v

I

The Tito-Subasic Agreement of November 1, 1944, had given
both Tito and the Royal Yugoslav Government a chance to work
together to form a united Yugoslav government.

The

Agreement had tacitly recognized both the power of Tito and
his followers and their acceptance, at least for the time
being, of the existence of the monarchy.
The United States still maintained its ambassador in
London (Patterson) to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (The
Royal Yugoslav Government), but had also established direct
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contacts within Yugoslavia.

The American Military Mission

had arrived in Yugoslavia in August 1943, and by August
1944, was stationed at Partisan Headquarters at Vis.

By

October, elements of the military mission were over much of
the country, including Serbia.

Stettinius had made it clear

that the American government found nothing incompatable in
the points made in the Tito-Subasi~ Agreement, but had been
sure to point out that its implementation might not be very
easy.

This latter point would be brought into sharp focus

throughout 1945.

First, the King would balk at the

implementation as he realized what it did to his position.
And second, it became increasingly difficult to compromise
--- I

with Tito.

The American government and members of the U.S.

1

press corps in Europe continually pointed out the lack of
democracy and the growth of a Communist dictatorship in
Yugoslavia.

The face of internal events in Yugoslavia did

play an increasingly important role in how outsiders and
particularly the United States viewed Yugoslavia.

The

internal events in Yugoslavia created problems for the
American government, causing a long delay in its recognition
of the Yugoslav government.

CHAPTER VI
1945 AND 1946
The position of the King vis-a-vis Tito within
Yugoslavia became much more crucial after the King learned

,,,

" ,

of the Tito-Subasic Agreement.

King Peter was described by

both American and British diplomats as being very
apprehensive concerning his future position.

The King was

very suspicious of AVNOJ and considered it illegal.

His

natural tendencies and those of his advisors were to ignore
the affairs and to push for the royal powers regardless of
the position of Tito and his supporters in Yugoslavia.

Once

again the British were dominant in dealing with the
situation and urged the monarch to come to grips with the
reality of his position.
Patterson, in a message to the Secretary of State on
January 12, 1945, wrote that the King and his Prime Minister
were at complete odds concerning the Tito-~ubasid Agreement
and that the Prime Minister had almost resigned from the
government for what he considered to be the King's
unconstitutional behavior.

The King did, however, agree to

some of the terms in the Agreement, but wished to clarify
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his position.

The King was in search of a compromise that

would not allow his fate to be determined almost solely by

men not in his confidence.
The King's position was perhaps most accurately
described in the press.

The King was originally against the

Regency, as he found no constitutional grounds for it under
current conditions.

He was described as not totally opposed

to the idea of a regency, but wished to add qualifiers to its
implementation before he would accept it.
conditions for approving the Regency:

He had three

first, that he would

name the regents; second, that the legislative powers of the
new government be limited until after a constituent assembly
could be elected; and third, that he, himself, be allowed to
return.
The King began to search for a solution to his
problems; that is, a Regency picked and approved by him and
the chance to save his throne, as outlined in the TitoSubasic Agreement.

The Secretary of State once again

reaffirmed the American position, which was that the
Yugoslavs should be allowed to choose their own political
fate and that all elements in the country should work
together to achieve that goal.

He also hinted that it would

be best if the Yugoslav government could soon be
reestablished in Belgrade and that Western ambassadors could
be sent there as representatives to a unified Yugoslav
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government.

He felt that the presence of Allied (Western)

representatives to a unified Yugoslav government could help

settle affairs in the country and lessen the increasing
1

totalitarian nature of the Yugoslav regime
The King's hesitation to accept the Tito-~ubasid
Agreement created problems for him that he could not
control.

His remarks were seen as threatening a very

promising chance for establishing a united post-war
government.

Tito's faction called the King's protest

unconstitutional and threatened to use it as a pretext for
ending the monarchy once and for all.

Churchill, in a

speech to the House of Commons on January 18, 1945, said of
the King's hesitancy:
It is a matter of days within which a decision must
be reached upon these matters, and if we were so
unfortunate as not to be able to obtain the consent
of King Peter, the matter, in fact, would have to
go ahead, his assent being presumed.2
The United States replied that it had not participated
in the Tito-Subasic talks and had only approved of their
broad outline--that they favored the return of the Yugoslav
Government in Exile, but that even if it returned to
Yugoslavia, the United States could offer nothing beyond
provisional representation at Belgrade.
In a message from the Acting Secretary of State to
Ambassador Harriman,

u.

S. envoy to the Soviet Union, the
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outline of a message received from Stalin via the British
was sent.

Stalin was reported to have favored immediate

acceptance by all major powers of the Tito-~ubasic Agreement
and considered U.S. reservations on the subject as an
encouragement to the King and a possible stumbling block to
inter-Allied cooperation.

He saw the issue as dividing the

Americans from their British and Soviet partners.
Ambassador Patterson received a message from the Acting
Secretary of State outlining the American position on the
situation on January 29, 1945.

He said that America had

come a long way towards muting the British position, but
would wait for further clarification from the Yugoslavs
themselves.
We understand from the agreement between Marshal
Tito and Dr. Subasic that the proposed United
Government of Yugoslavia is to be set up for the
interim or transitional period pending the holding
of national elections in which the will of the
people may be freely expressed. We would be
prepared to accredit our Ambassador to a government
set up in Yugoslavia on this basis.3
In a memorandum written by the Chief of the Division of
Southern European affairs, Cavendish

w.

Cannon, the

situation in Yugoslavia was discussed from the perspective
of Soviet intentions.
seven parts.
relationships.

Cannon divided his memorandum into

The first five discussed internal Yugoslav
He remarked that Serbian support for Tito

now seemed strong, but that Croatian opinion was divided
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between Tito and the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party.
Tito was described as being very much against the Croatian

Peasant Party.
The Soviet government has shown no particular
interest in learning what the United States thinks
about the Yugoslav situation. It frankly has not
asked for a common policy. It has its plans and is
willing to go ahead. The British are trying to
keep even with the Russians, and one cannot but
feel their anxiety to have us go along is in large
part a design to prepare a facade of Allied action
to cover the interplay of British and Soviet
political forces in the Balkans and distribute the
responsibility when the general public later learns
of the real conditions within Yugoslavia and the
type of administration the Army expects to set up.4
Cannon wrote about the impossibility of the Allies
being on an equal basis in Yugoslavia.

He pointed out the

presence of Soviet troops in the country and Tito's
acceptance and growing use of Communism in Yugoslavia.

He

wrote that neither Britain nor the Soviet Union had any wish
to help the Yugoslav people, but were only interested in
carrying out their political roles in the Balkans.
Developments in Yugoslavia and with the King in London
were beginning to affect the situation.

It appeared that

Subasic and members of the Cabinet were preparing to go back
to Yugoslavia regardless of the King's actions or
pronouncements.
treat the

~

~

The British had asked the Americans to
I

~ubasic

government the same in Belgrade as they

did in London, if it would finally take residence there.
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The Secretary of State received a message sent by Kirk on
February 2, 1954, disclaiming Tito's need to compromise on

the situation.

Tito's position was now considered so strong

within Yugoslavia that he would not relax his growing
stranglehold on the country for the benefit of external
recognition.
In February, the King finally announced the three men
he wished to represent him as the Regency Council and to
deal on his behalf with Tito inside Yugoslavia.

However,

Tito was quick to denounce two of these individuals, and
affairs appeared to have come to an impasse.

Tito thought

the King was unreasonable and was simply trying to prevent
the implementation of the Agreement.

Tito now threatened to

try the King for his "crimes1" and the King, for his part,
stated that he would disavow his entire Cabinet if they went
to Belgrade.
Regardless of the actions taken by both the King and
Tito, the Regents were on their way to Yugoslavia on the
13th of January.

Plans for enlarging AVNOJ and the

moderation of Yugoslav politics could perhaps begin
immediately according to reports sent back to the State
Department.

The United States made an official announcement

concerning events in Yugoslavia (and liberated Europe) on
February 26, 1945, following discussions at the Crimean
Conference.
In the Crimean Declaration of February 11, Roosevelt,
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Stalin, and Churchill agreed to recommend to Tito and
~ubasicf that the agreement between them should be put into

effect immediately and that a new government should be
formed on the basis of that agreement.

At the same time, a

declaration of liberated Europe was published in which
Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill agreed to coordinate the
policies of their governments to assist liberated peoples to
solve by democratic means their pressing political and
economic problems.

Among the situations in which this

assistance would be applicable would be cases where, in the
judgment of the principal Allies, the conditions within a
liberated state required that interim governmental
authorities be formed which would be broadly representative
of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to
the earliest possible establishment through free elections
of governments responsible to the will of the people.
Accordingly, the United States government would
like to see Subasic and Marshal Tito reach an early
agreement in accordance with these principles and
in a spirit of mutual understanding in the
negotiations now taking place in Belgrade.5
Still, problems remained with the Yugoslavs themselves.
The King's nominees to the Regency Council were not
acceptable to the members of AVNOJ, and the Agreement might
also have collapsed because of the King's wishes to have the
complete determination of who was to represent him.
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~uba~id, who remained in contact with the British, began to

transmit worried messages about the ability of the TitoSubasic~ Agreement to withstand the King's intransigence,

especially in view of Tito's growing impatience.

The

American government retained its previous policy of not
forcing the King to act.
On March 21, James C. Dunn, acting for the Secretary of
...,,
State, sent a message to the Yugoslav Charge, Franges,
acknowledging the formation of the Regency Council on March
4, 1946 by King Peter.

The Regents were Dr. srdjan

Budisvljevie', Dr. Ante Mandie, and Dusan Sernec.

It also

acknowledged the formation of a new and united government in
v

,

Yugoslavia with Tito as Acting President and Subasic as
Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
This note also hinted at sending Ambassador Patterson and
his staff to Belgrade in the near future.
American interest in the personal freedoms of the
Yugoslav population began to be stimulated in 1945.

Reports

and discussions of the feelings of the general populace were
beginning to be heard.

The facade of complete agreement

between Tito and his National Liberation Front and the
majority of the Yugoslav population became less secure.

A

report from Europe by American representatives began to tell
different stories:
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In general, the present regime is referred to by
the people as 'those people' and it seems evident
that when the government is established a great

deal will be expected of it.

That it will be the

same thing as at present under different color is
realized only by a relative few.7
Messages now began to flood Washington outlining the
internal situation in Yugoslavia.

The Partisans were

granted influence and some degree of popularity for their
prosecution of the war, but nowhere could it be determined
that they were universally popular.

It became increasingly

evident that they were more feared than trusted.

In fact,

terrorism was a term gaining currency for many observers of
Yugoslav internal affairs.
The new government was not believed to have much power,
and the growing strength of the Tito element was evident in
all areas of the country's life.

Kirk described the power

as being held by Tito, Kardelj, Hubrang, and Djilas, among
others, all of whom, he was quick to point out, were Moscow8

trained and oriented.
In April, Tito requested American aid from Ambassador
Patterson.
i~formed

In that meeting, the Americans were also

that Tito would visit the Soviet Union to discuss

matters with the top members of the Soviet Government.
Averill Harriman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
could only speculate in a message to Washington what had
occurred between Tito and his Soviet hosts.

He speculated,
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however, on a possible alliance between the two countries
and that any concrete policy decisions would have to wait

the test of time to see whether the Yugoslavs and the
9

Soviets would work in greater coordination.
Ambassador Patterson relayed the views of Milan Grol, a
member of the new government and an important pre-war
Serbian politician.

He described the situation in

Yugoslavia as growing dimmer daily as Communists
increasingly took hold of virtually all the political and
~

administrative posts.

~

I

Subasic was described as a virtual

prisoner, while acting as Yugoslav Foreign Minister, and
there was almost no one in the government who could. argue
for greater democratization of the Yugoslav society.

It was

also suggested that Tito was a Soviet puppet.
Carl F. Norton of the Division of Southern European
Affai~s,

sent a memorandum to Washington discussing the

internal affairs in Yugosalvia as he perceived that the
Partisans viewed them.

Edward Kardelj , perhaps the number

two or three man in the Partisan movement, was interviewed.
He, as could be expected, supported the actions of AVNOJ and
Tito.

He explained that most members of the pre-war

political elite had disgraced themselves by their actions
during the war and could not be allowed to participate in
the new government.

Kardelj also contrasted the Yugoslav

experience with the United States.

He remarked that long

periods of dictatorship and falsified elections had ill-
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prepared the Yugoslavs for a democracy in the American mold.
He stated that Yugoslavia must make its own road, and,
unlike America, it had many traitors and war criminals to
deal with.

It can be assumed that these views were at least

semi-official and contrasted greatly with those of Grol,
who, unlike Kardelj, was in no position to do anything about
10

it.
The Soviet Union and the Regency Council of Yugoslavia
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar
Cooperation in Moscow on April 11, 1945.

When Harriman

reported the event to Washington on April 13, 1945,
he mentioned that the treaty was almost identical to the one
signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.
However, there was one exception that Harriman noted:
Article 3, which declares that the contracting
parties would participate in a spirit of the most
sincere cooperation in all international activities
directed to secure peace and security • • • • "11
American-Yugoslav difficulties began to increase as
Yugoslav soldiers pushed outside their borders into Austria
and Italy.

American and British troops were in a virtual

race to liberate Trieste before the Partisans could capture
the city.

Both the Yugoslavs and the Western Allies wished

to control Trieste for its geographical and economic
importance.

To Yugoslavia, it represented a far larger and

more modern port than anything then or in the foreseeable
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future available in Yugoslavia.

It also would be a feather

in the cap of Socialist Yugoslavia, aiding Socialists in

other countries, in particular, Italy.

The British and

Americans saw it as the southern gateway into Austria, the
logical port for Austrian commerce.

It was also of

political significance because they wished to prevent
Yugoslav/Russian presence in the territory.

The Western

Allies feared that Yugoslavs in Trieste would strengthen and
aid the growing Italian Socialist movement, and neither
power wished to see Italy become a Socialist state.
During the problems in Trieste, Churchill and Harry

s.

Truman, Roosevelt's successor, kept a running correspondence
concerning Yugoslav actions.

Both leaders considered Tito

to be backed by the Soviet Union.
~eceived

from Stalin on May 23.

Truman cited a message he
Truman wrote:

"The Russian

Premier backed Tito in his claims and hoped that the
conflict would be terminated by "our acceptance of the
12
Yugoslav position."
Churchill wrote that
In order to avoid leading Tito or the Yugoslav
commanders into any temptation, it would be wise to
have a solid mass of troops in this area, with a
great superiority of modern weapons • • • • 13
Truman cabled Churchill stating that he was
"increasingly concerned over the implications of Tito's
14
actions in Venezia Giulia • •
He wrote that Tito's
"

..

forces must immediately submit themselves to the authority
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of the Allied Commander.

Churchill termed Truman's message

15
"a most welcome and strong message."

The two Western

Allies now pushed in large numbers of troops under British
command and caused the eventual evacuation of Yugoslav
forces from Trieste.

The Soviets protested but did little

else, and Truman was relieved that no fighting had occurred
so that he could concentrate on ending the war in the
Pacific.

Churchill was happy to be able to confront Stalin

with a combined effort against Tito and hoped it might carry
into other diplomatic problems.

He wrote:

"I need not say

how relieved I was to receive this invaluable support from
16
my new companion."
Truman summarized his feelings on
Venezia Giulia thusly:

"The American government never for a

moment considered that Trieste should go to Yugoslavia.

17
That was Roosevelt's position, and it was mine."
The American and British opposition to the occupation
of Trieste provoked General Jovanovid, Chief of Staff of the
Yugoslav Army, who "rudely requested British and American
military missions in Belgrade (and their field

18
representatives) to leave Yugoslavia."
The United States had, however, indicated that certain
border corrections might be made along the old YugoslavItalian border, but that any such move must wait for the
appropriate peace treaty.

In May, Secretary of State

Stettinius and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Subasi~ held a
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meeting in San Francisco in which Subasid requested lendlease aid.

Subasid was rebuked for the Yugoslav attitude

concerning Venezia Giulia and Carinthia.

Stettinius saw no

chance of aiding Yugoslavia until its attitude softened.
on his way back to Belgrade, Subasic stopped in
Washington and continued his high-level talks with members
of the State Department.

There he once again put forth

Yugoslav claims to be a part of the administration of
Venezia Giulia.

He was told that Marshal Alexander was the

primary authority in the area and that any Yugoslav actions
would have to be subordinated to his wishes.
V

When
V

I

discussion turned to the Yalta formulas, Subasic had been
19

defensive in his response, "progress has been slow."
v

v

I

Upon arriving in Belgrade, Subasic held talks with the
American Ambassador, who once again cautioned him to stop
Yugoslav actions in the Venezia Giulia area.

The Ambassador

warned of Yugoslav problems with American public opinion,
which now considered Yugoslavia a virtual Communist
dictatorship on the Russian model.

As the American

government began to receive further information on Yugoslav
developments, their scepticism of Tito's aims grew.

The

fulfillment of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia became
increasingly in doubt.*

The State Department began

* This is in reference to a freely-chosen government and
freedom of speech and

pre~s.
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receiving messages from its representatives throughout
Europe regarding the events within Yugoslavia.

These

reports, which became redundant, told of the political
killings of opponents of the Partisans, persecution of the
clergy, and the nationalization of private industry,
including the property of American nationals and
corporations.
The American press printed many articles containing
criticism of Yugoslavia.

The press described Yugoslavia as

a dictatorship growing daily in its ability to stifle
thought and opposition within the country.

Sam Pope Brewer

of The New York Times wrote that civil rights, as understood
in America, did not exist in Yugoslavia and that all forms
of censorship were being increasingly foisted upon
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia today is a striking picture of conflict
between the high democratic ideals repeatedly
proclaimed by her leaders and oppressive strong
armed methods in running the Government. It is a
tyranny exercised in the name of the people by a
minority too well organized and too heavily armed
to be disputed.20
The American Ambassador to France, Lafferty, described
21

Yugoslavia as a "Communist dictatorship."

The State

Department again had more harsh words to describe the
attitude of the Yugoslav government to the Yalta
Declaration.

It called Yugoslavia's attempt at implementing
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In the same piece,

the accords "a farce and a mockery."

the State Department quoted a speech given by Tito in Serbia
on June 17, 1945.

In his speech, Tito mentioned the great

help Yugoslavia had received from the Soviet Union.

The

State Department pointed out that "no mention has been made
throughout the speech of any help coming during or after the
23

war from any of the Western Allies."
The American Charge in Yugoslavia, Harold Shantz,
stated:
I am convinced that there is no hope of free
democracy here and that the new laws will be window
dressing for totalitarian communist regime.24
The situation in Yugoslavia was not lost to the King,
who also understood its implications for him.

He stated

publicly and later wrote in his autobiography that Tito had
repudiated the Tito-Subasit Agreement and was not living up
to the Yalta recommendations and that he must also repudiate
v b ""•I
•
t h e Tito-Su
asic Agreement.

King Peter announced once again

that he was sole arbiter of the royal perogative within
Yugoslavia and the Regents were discharged from their
25
responsibilities.
His pronouncements met with only
limited response as his position was almost hopeless without
massive support from both Great Britain and the United
States.
In an unofficial meeting with Tito, the American
Ambassador Patterson reported to President Truman
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• • • I told Tito that without the authority of my
government and unofficially, he could expect no
economic help from my country whatsoever unless he

carried out his solemn commitments made at Yalta
and upon which we recognized him. The President
replied, 'You did the right thing.'26
The United States and Great Britain were becoming very
upset by events in Eastern Europe at this time.

The Western

Allies felt that the Yalta Declarations on freedom of choice
and the establishments of democratic governments were being
ignored by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet ability to

transform governments into a socialist form was troublesome
and occurred without consulting Western viewpoints.
Yugoslavia was considered a prime example, but events along
these lines were happening in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria
at this time.

The Western Allies began to view Eastern

Europe as a Soviet colony with Yugoslavia perhaps working
under orders direct from Moscow, and they resented Soviet
domination.
Milovan Djilas, a leading Partisan intellectual and
political leader, in a speech reported by Shantz to
Washington, discussed the Partisan viewpoint on the upcoming
elections.

His remarks were seen as a blatant example of

the Tito regime's confidence in its position within
Yugoslavia.

The remarks did nothing to calm American

apprehensions, but only added fuel to the American belief
that Yugoslavia would go her own way regardless of Yalta.
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The Secretary of State held a discussion with King
Peter in London on September 13, 1945.

The two men

discussed the internal situation in Yugoslavia and the
upcoming elections.
King Peter said that the four freedoms guaranteed
by the Allies did not exist in Yugoslavia and that
Marshal Tito had violated all his promises to the
Allies in that he had ignored his commitments
outlined in the Tito-Subasic Agreement, to which
the Secretary replied, in essence, that he had been
informed of this • • • • Peter said, 'If you permit
the elections to be held now, and they are not
free, then you will be forced not to recognize the
government which results from such elections!' To
this, Secretary Byrnes indicated that was a
possibility.
The King made one last point at this meeting:
King Peter then said 'we have had many nice words
and promises from the Allies, but no action.' The
Secretary replied • • • that on that point many
people agreed.27
The State Department received a message from a
representatiave in Yugoslavia on September 15, 1945.

It

reported that the opposition candidates had removed
themselves from the election lists because they considered
the forthcoming elections to be neither democratic nor
representative of the political will of the people.
On September 27, 1945, Harold Shantz, State Department
Representative in Yugoslavia, wrote a long report to the
State Department concerning his views on the internal
28
affairs in Yugoslavia.
His report was very representative
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of the mainstream of American thoughts on Yugoslavia at this
time.

He reported that the elections to be held on November

11, 1945, could not express the free will of the people and
should be postponed.

He later wrote in this report that

democracy in Yugoslavia had disappeared and the country was
being governed by external forces.

He wrote, "Yet a

relatively small group of Communists inspired and directed
by Moscow, has succeeded in fostering a ruthless
totalitarian police regime on the Yugoslavs."

He added

later that "The regime and its chief public agency, the
National Front, are in effect tools of the Central Committee
29
of the Communist Party. Tito is an agent of Moscow."
Schantz ended his report by writing that Yugoslavia was a
country living in fear and that the United States could do
nothing but use moral force to help the people.
Patterson reported to the Secretary of State on October
10, 1945, of the resignations from the Yugoslav Government

of Grol,

Sutej,

V

v

v

I

Subasic, and Junakovic (the Vice President

of the Yugoslav National Bank).

'

Suba~ic said that his
\/

agreements with Tito had not been carried out and that he
owed it to the people to resign.
Tito spoke with a touring group of American
congressmen, and he expressed surprise at the resignations.
He stated that there were no differences and that the
opposition leaders were wrong in their views of the Yugoslav
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political scene.

Tito was quoted by Patterson on this

occasion, after announcing that 200,000 Yugoslavs had been
demobilized:

"He said demobilization for Yugoslavia is a

social as well as a military problem since many soldiers
have no home or livelihood to return to."

Later in the same

report, Patterson noted
Congressmen upon leaving the airport today said
Tito's presentation was to them unconvincing and it
had hedged on important questions of large army and
plight of opposition.30
V

'V

I

Patterson also talked to Subasic about recent
developments.

v

V

I

·

Subasic confirmed that Tito had accepted his

resignation, but stated that he would not announce it
publicly for fear of its effect on Big Power relations •
.,

y

,

Subasic stated that he believed that Tito was not the
supreme power in the country, but shared it with Kardelj and
Rankovic.

V

'°'

I

Subasic said that he had already been accused of

being an agent for Great Britain and the United States.

He

also reported that leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party
were now more than ever behind Vlado Ma~ek (the Party
leader).
Patterson received a message from the Secretary of
State in reference to an August 29, 1945 loan request from
the Yugoslavs.
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In view of the political situation in Yugoslavia,
E. feels that the United States should be cool
toward a loan to Yugoslavia at the present time.

s.

The Export Import Bank is not contemplating any
action on the request until questions of policy are
settled by the Department. It is generally agreed
that the figure of $300 million is entirely too
large.31
More internal problems arose after Grol held a meeting
with touring American congressmen, who reported that the
reason he removed himself from the election was that he
feared to appear in public for his own safety and could not
ask his followers to expose themselves to similar dangers.
Religious leaders in Yugoslavia were also very much
against the regime.

Archbishop Stepinac and other Catholic

leaders published many charges against the regime's brutal
32
and undemocratic conduct.
James Reston wrote in The New York Times on October 12,
1945 about the political situation in Yugoslavia.

He stated

the usual attacks against the growth of totalitarianism in
the country and also the lack of follow-through on the part
of Tito and his followers regarding the Yalta Declarations.
More importantly, he wrote publicly about the dilemma now
facing the American government--how to handle the problem of
recognizing the Tito regime when the regents and almost all
members of the old pre-war political parties had resigned
and refused to participate in the forthcoming elections.
As expected, the State Department also began exploring
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its relationship with Yugoslavia.

The Crimea Conference

influenced the American attitudes on Yugoslavia to the Tito-

~ubaSic Agreement, but with Suba~ic's resignation, the State
Department believed that the Agreement lost its validity.
How could the Yugoslav government now be considered a
"proper instrument" if only one side was now represented in
the government?

The American government sought the help of

the Soviet Union and Great Britain in bringing about a
reconciliation between Tito and Subasic.

In lieu of this,

the State Department sent messages to Moscow and London
asking those governments to urge Tito to postpone the coming
elections.
Patterson held discussions with Tito in Belgrade on
American-Yugoslav relations in which he stated the American
position about the abrogation of the Yalta Declaration by
Yugoslavia and the concern for the internal repression in
Yugoslavia.

He brought up in particular the lack of a free

press and the lack of meaning a one-party election would
have.

Tito replied that Yugoslavia had met her obligations

as discussed at Yalta and that laws had been passed
guaranteeing freedom of the press and free elections.
The American government was quick to receive the
British and Soviet responses to its request to have Tito
postpone the elections.

The Russians stated that there were

no grounds to interfere in Yugoslavia and that the present
Yugoslav government (Tito's) should be allowed to set its
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own date for the election.

The British, although more

sympathetic than the Russians, also believed it better to

stay out of internal Yugoslav affairs and let the elections
go as scheduled.

It seemed that the British had recognized

Tito's future success and did not wish to antagonize him,
which might result in repercussions later.
Ambassador Patterson sent a recapitulation of the
American position vis-vis Yugoslavia to the Yugoslav
Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tito) on November 6, 1945.
Patterson told Tito that the United States viewed the
upcoming election as unrepresentative of the Yugoslav
people.

He also stressed that it was so set up that the

opposition leaders had felt it necessary to remain away from
this contest.

He said that these circumstances had brought

the very validity of the elections into question and without
the guarantees outlined in the Tito-~ubasi~ Agreement being
met, the prestige of the Yugoslav government and confidence
33

in it abroad would suffer.
The Yugoslavs held the election on schedule.

Patterson

sent a report back to Washington in which he described the
elections as fairly quiet.

He said by this time no

"terroristic" methods were needed and the population was
well behaved.

The results were reported as 83.2% for the

Front and 16.8% for the Opposition.
Because of the regime subsequently installed in
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Yugoslavia, much debate went on within the American
government as to what status it should give former members

of the old Yugoslav regime whom the Tito government demanded
be returned to face trial.

Patterson wrote that categories

defined by the Yugoslav government were so nebulous as to
allow for any interpretation deemed appropriate by Yugoslav
authorities.

Therefore, America must be careful to avoid

sending innocent people back to the country.

Patterson

believed that individuals returned to the country had
already been judged and were most probably already
condemned.
Tito responded to Ambassador Patterson's fears on
November 19, 1945.

Tito said that the recommendations of

the Yalta Conference had been fully carried out and that any
objections to this fact could have no real substance.

He

wrote that Yugoslavia could now consider all her obligations
to the Allied governments as carried out.

The people had

responded on November 11, 1945, by their vast support for
the government in the election.

Tito also discussed the

King, whom he said had no place in the country, because the
34

people no longer recognized or wanted him.
The British and the Russians had made no protests over
the elections and instantly recognized the results.

The

United States, on the other hand, was not sure it would
recognize the election.
A memorandum prepared by the Acting Chief, Division of
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Southern European Affairs, Samuel Reber, was sent to the
Secretary of State on November 24, 1945.

This memorandum

discussed recent events in Yugoslavia, including the
election and Tito's message in which he declared the
fulfillment of Yugoslavia's obligations as set forth in the
Yalta Declaration.

He wrote at length about reaccrediting

Ambassador Patterson to the new Yugoslav government.

He

pointed out that he was still accredited to the now nonexistent Royal government.

He wrote that there were

obviously grounds for the American government to withhold
such recognition, but saw no valid reason to do so.

He

recommended that the United States bite the bullet and
recognize the Tito regime.

However, he was adamant in

refusing any economic assistance to Yugoslavia.

He felt

that aid could perhaps give the United States some leverage
in lessening the "terrorism" within Yugoslavia.
Ambassador Patterson began, by late 1945, to send more
frequent examples of Yugoslavia's increasingly anti-Western
stance.

He cited the fact that radio stations and

publishing houses had been restricted from using American or
British news sources.

On November 29, 1945, Patterson wrote

the Secretary of State and asked that the U.S. withhold
recognition of the Tito regime.

He also stated that

Belgrade was, in foreign policy terms, a "Soviet Republic,"
that the regime was hostile to America and Britain and could
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not stand on its own without Soviet support.
Ambassador Patterson believed, like the British, that
the Yugoslav majority was anti-Communist, that in a free
election Communist representation would all but disappear.
He, like Peter, believed that if left to its own political
devices, the Tito regime would slowly liberalize the country
and bring it into closer alignment with the United States
and Britain.

He stated that at present, however,

"the U.S.

has no influence on this regime and cannot have as long as
36

normal recognition is extended."
The Ambassador summed up the financial situation of the
Yugoslavs thusly:
Economically, people are rapidly being stripped of
their possessions. Before long, private capital
and business will have diappeared, even if some
business continues to be done in some private
firms. Government gives lip service to private
trade hoping to gain our economic support while
concealing its ultimate objectives.37
December 1, 1945, the abolition of the monarchy was
announced, and the Federative National Republic of
Yugoslavia was established.

Acting Secretary of State, Dean

Acheson, notified the Secretary of State in Moscow of the
latest messages received from Ambassador Patterson in
Yugoslavia.

With the impending British recognition of the

new Yugoslav government, (Britain recognized the new
government on December 15, 1945), a possible presidential
response was sent to Byrnes.

It stated first that the
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United States was still very concerned about the personal
freedoms of the Yugoslav peoples; secondly, that the

situation had not changed since the election; and, thirdly,
that if the

u. s.

government recognized the new Yugoslav

government, this would by no means be considered as an
38

acceptance of internal Yugoslav policies.
The American attitude toward Yugoslavia changed little
in 1945.

The United States government knew who held the

power and ran Yugoslavia, but was as yet not ready to change
its diplomatic stance.
Early in 1946, the problem of granting Tito permission
to come to the United States was again brought to the fore.
Tito wanted to come for an official visit to the United
States to increase his and his regime's prestige and if
possible to secure American economic aid for Yugoslavia.
Patterson received a message from the Acting Secretary of
State concerning Tito's request for a visit to the United
States, which stated that the
from a visit by Tito.

u. s.

could see no good coming

Such a visit could create trouble

within the American-Yugoslav community as it might be
construed as an acceptance or an approval of Tito's methods
and actions within Yugoslavia.

The Acting Secretary also

reiterated the fact that under present political
circumstances, the United States was not ready to discuss
aid for Yugoslavia.

Patterson was instructed to relay these
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views semi-officially to the Yugoslavs.
Yugoslavia became more interested in receiving U. S.

economic aid to help in its postwar economic development.
However, American responses to these inquiries were
consistently negative.

The United States was worried about

Yugoslav claims to parts of Austria and Italy and was even
more concerned about a possible abrogation of previous
Yugoslav government economic and financial agreements.
At the same time as these discussions were being
carried out within the State Department, the Secretary of
State publicly defined the current status of American
recognition of Yugoslavia.

Byrnes pointed out that the

United States had never completed its recognition of Tito.
He also reminded his listeners that Ambassador Patterson was
still accredited to the King and was an interim
representative in Belgrade.

He said that the United States

was waiting to see whether Yugoslavia would observe its
obligatons under the "existing treaties of amity and
40

commerce."
It had become apparent that the status quo between the
United States and Yugoslavia could not be maintained
indefinitely.

The Secretary of State held another news

conference in Washington on March 12, 1946, in which he
again pointed out the difficulty in fully recognizing the
regime in Yugoslavia.

He again stated that the United

States was waiting for Yugoslavia to accept its
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international obligations.

He also added that the United

States wished to see personal freedoms and q free election

held in Yugoslavia.
Secretary of State Byrnes sent President Truman a
memorandum on April 9, 1946, in which he recommended the
recognition by the United States of the current government
in Yugoslavia, as well as the accreditation of Kosanovic! as
the Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States.

He stated

that Yugoslavia had finally agreed to accept its
international obligations and responsibilities.

He ended

his memorandum by suggesting that the United States fully
accredit Ambassador Patterson to the present Yugoslav
41
regime.
On April 16, 1946, the United States government
delivered a message to the Yugoslav Charge d'Affairs
offering a formal recognition of the Yugoslav government.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The United States' first involvement in Yugoslavia was
to try to prevent the country from joining the Tripartite
Pact and then to encourage Yugoslav resistance to the
expected German invasion.

These American moves mirrored

closely the British actions of the time.

The United States

would follow or react to British initiatives throughout
world War II regarding Yugoslavia.

The United States, after

its initial enthusiasm for Yugoslavia following the coup in
1941, retreated from any major actions concerning that
country for months and left the British to do as they wished
in Yugoslavia.
Churchill, more than any American leader, was
responsible for dividing Western actions in Yugoslavia.
Although America became directly involved in Yugoslavia, it
was usually as a response to some event that had already
been carried out, for example the Tito-~ubasid Agreement or
the outlawing of the monarchy by the Tito regime.

The

United States recognized that the British and the Soviets
had special interests in the area and wished to remain free
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of these powers and deal with Yugoslavia on strictly
American terms.

Because the United States had no special interests in
Yugoslavia, it thought to prevent any major assistance,
either military or political to Yugoslavia.

This was to

allow America to use its resources in more important areas
of the war.

America was far more engaged in the Pacific

war than were either the British or the Soviets, and the
Americans never let themselves become too involved in
Yugoslavia or the Balkans because of it.
The American policy during the war was to maintain
proper diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government,
but not to commit itself to any substantial degree.

When

the United States once again returned to Yugoslav soil, it
was only on a very limited basis.

The American military

mission and later political representatives allowed the
United States to form its own opinions on the war in
Yugoslavia.

This brought American knowledge of internal

Yugoslav affairs to a level higher than it had been for
years, but still allowed the United States to limit its
response to Yugoslav issues.
The United States became aware of the Yugoslav civil
war and wished it to cease, but no American initiatives were
brought forward to help end it.

The United States insisted

that its aid in Yugoslavia be used in eliminating the
external foe and not be used against domestic opponents.
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The United States would recognize Tito's position and
even credited him with a degree of popularity in the
country, but was unhappy with his political tone and everincreasing totalitarianism, i.e., Soviet measures within the
country.

Tito held power; the Americans knew it and finally

accepted it.

They realized that any serious attempt to try

to influence the Yugoslav domestic situation could be both
expensive and time-consuming, using resources earmarked for
other, more important areas.
The American governmen.t lost almost no troops on
Yugoslav soil, and its economic commitment during the war
was insignificant, as it was to remain until 1948.
Yugoslavia was never treated as a major theater for American
actions, nor was it every seriously considered for such a
role regardless of British and/or Yugoslav government
(Royal) hopes.

The American policy of non-intervention was

successfully followed and, even after the recognition of the
new Yugoslav situation, the United States remained only
passively interested in that country.

American aid for Tito

came years after the war and then only after he had reacted
against Soviet pressure.

The King, although not speaking

just about the Americans, remarked bitterly about his
government's treatment by the Western Allies.
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I most certainly feel that no act of mine was or
could have been responsible for the vile treatment
I and my government received so unexpectedly and
unjustly.!
President Truman characterized his policy in Yugoslavia
as keeping America out of any Balkan imbroglio and concluded
that events in Yugoslavia were carried forward by their own
momentum:
I was trying to be extremely careful not to get us
mixed up in a Balkan turmoil. The Balkans had long
been a source of trouble and war. I believed that
if the political situation in the Balkans could be
adjusted so that Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and
Bulgaria, as well as Poland and Austria could all
have governments of their own people's choosing
with no outside influence, this would help us in
our own plans for peace.
I did not want to become involved in the Balkans in
a way that would lead us into another world
conflict. In any case, I was anxious to get the
Russians into the war against Japan as soon as
possible, thus saving countless Americans.

CHAPTER VIII
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
The secondary works used in this study were written
from many different perspectives and for many different
reasons.

The majority of works to be discussed here cover

Yugoslavia only as a small part of a large and complex
problem.

Authors such as Herbert Feis and Gabriel Kolko are

among this group.

There were also books which dealt directly

with Yugoslavia and which were much more restrictive in
their subject matter.

This bibliographical essay is

concerned with both types of works and will begin with
material which is specific to Yugoslavia.
Walter Roberts' Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies was
written by an American diplomat who had worked and spent
much time in Yugoslavia.

He reviewed his work as a broad

general outline of wartime events in Yugoslavia.

In the

introduction, he states that he wished to clarify and
correct many misconceptions about Yugoslavia.

He tried to

cover the topic from a neutral perspective, attempting to
refrain from being overly enthusiastic about either of the
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two main characters in Yugoslavia during the war--Draza
Mihailovicand the Cetniks and Josip Broz Tito and the
Partisans.

It must be admitted that he succeeded in

comparison to works such as Constantin Foti6 1 s (Ambassador
to the United States from Yugoslavia during the war) The War
We Lost, or Vladimir Dedijer's (who participated at the
pinnacle of Partisan leadership and planning) Tito.

Men

such as these have been too closely involved and tried only
to embellish their side's collective accomplishments, while
conversely assailing their opponents at will and with little
regard for accuracy.

However, the reader must be cautioned

about being too optimistic regarding Roberts, as his sources
are weighted heavily on the Partisan (Communist) side.
Although this is understandable, the former Partisans now
control the literature and sources on this topic in
Yugoslavia, so the material is biased.

Even today,

Yugoslavia still worries about the legitimization of its
Communist takeover.
Roberts also used many primary sources from British
authors.

Since his book covers a much broader topic than

this paper, most British material cannot be accurately
discussed.

This author agrees with Roberts that it was

written, as almost all books are, to substantiate the
feelings and experiences of the author. (e.g., Fitzroy
Maclean's Disputed Barricade).
To be more specific, Roberts wrote about the war in
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Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945, while this paper is more
closely limited to American-Yugoslav relations from 1941 to

1946.

He wrote about all phases of the conflict, spending a

great deal of time on the fighting itself--a topic that is
discussed only in passing in this paper, as it, in most
cases, did not greatly affect American diplomatic responses
nor did it hasten or impede America's final diplomatic
recognition of the Tito regime.

Nevertheless, this author

did use a great many of the same sources, including the
Foreign Relations of the United States and several
autobiographies.
Roberts must also be compared to the authors discussed
later, including Feis, whom Roberts mentions in his
bibliography and who closely resembles his approach to the
problems, except that Roberts, like this author, spent
proportionately far less time on Venezia Giulia than does
Feis.

Feis discussed the Venezia Giulia situation in great

depth because of its broader outlines.

This was a small

part of the story for both this author and for Roberts.
Venezia Guila had important implications in the beginnings
of the Cold War, but for this paper, it is less important
than it was for either Feis or Kolko.

The situation in

Venezia Giulia was not finally settled until approximately a
decade after America recognized Yugoslavia.

It was also, in

this author's opinion, overblown in importance as Yugoslavia
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would, in 1948, break with the Soviet Union; and the area
would help isolate Yugoslavia from both the East and the

West.
Roberts, and Kolko in The Politics of War, were in
agreement in only a few places; overall they differed far
more than they agreed.

They concurred in describing Tito's

disagreements and misunderstandings with the Soviets during
the war.

Kolko, however, was much more adamant in seeing

anti-Soviet beliefs and feelings than was Roberts.

Roberts,

whose perspective on the matter is similar to that of this
author, saw the Partisans as working for an independent and
Socialist Yugoslavia after the war.

They could not-

understand Soviet broader perspectives and were by no means
anti-Soviet.

In this latter belief, Roberts and this author

come very close to Vojtech Mastny's description of the
Yugoslav-Russian situation in Russia's Road to the Cold War
Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945.
Unlike Kolko, however, Roberts' treatment of the
American involvement in Yugoslavia during the war parallels
Feis and this author in asserting that American influence
was by design limited and not intended, as Kolko asserted,
to be a deciding factor in Yugoslav-Balkan affairs.
To this writer, Roberts' book was very helpful in
providing a general outline and a start for researching and
understanding the broad outlines of this topic.

Below, some

of the material covered by Roberts is discussed in more
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detail, and comments have been added where pertinent.
Roberts, as stated, traced American involvement in
Yugoslavia during the war.

This, of course, was at first

limited to military liaison officers and only at the very
end of the war by any foreign service officers.

He

discussed how the Americans joined the British missions
already in the field.

"From the very beginning, it was

clear, however, that the British were the senior partners in
1

this enterprise."
Summing up American actions in the Balkans at the end
of 1942, he said:
For the United States, Yugoslavia was at that time
a distant country, the geography of which had only
a limited significance in the pursuit of the war.
America regretted the existence of a civil war and
since it recognized the Yugoslav Government-inExile as the only legal government, it felt dutybound to support it and its Commander in
Yugoslavia, General Mihailovic.
Roberts spent much time showing how the forces of Tito
and Mihailovi~ reacted to each other and the total war
situation in Yugoslavia.

He summed up the American actions

in Yugoslavia at the end of 1943 as pragmatic in their
willingness to help all parties fighting the Germans.
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The United States had only military and strategic
considerations in mind in the Balkans.
It is
believed that if Tito was fighting and Mihailovic
was not, then Tito should be supported1 but this
support should be modest and in no way detract from
the pursuit of a grand strategy in which Balkan
affairs did not figure. Hence, U. S. interest in
the Balkans was limited.
In the U. S. view, to aid
Tito did not mean that the political support of the
Yugoslav Government-In-Exile should not continue.3

Roberts also summed up the military situation in
Yugoslavia at this time.

The Italians had surrendered, and

the ability of the Allies to defeat Germany was no longer
questioned by the author.

Tito's Partisans had been

recognized by the Big Three, and the Partisans were well on
the way to winning the Yugoslav civil war.

Still, Roberts

commented that this did not lead to any American political
posturing caused by the changing events within Yugoslavia.
The United States did begin to play a more active role
in Yugoslavia in 1944.

American policy was no longer in

agreement with Britain, nor did American military missions
continue to subordinate themselves to the British.

In

August of 1944, the Americans set up an independent mission
at the Partisan headquarters on Vis, after the British and
Soviets had already done so.

Roberts described Robert D.

Murphy's mission to Tito as in no way giving the impression
of any political recognition.
Roberts wrote at length of the Tito-Suba~i~ meetings
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and agreements.

He summed up the American role in these

activities as "Once again, the United States refused to
become involved in Yugoslav political matters, thus leaving
4

the field entirely to the British and.the Russians.2
Roberts summed up the American attitude at the end of
1944:

American leaders were not greatly surprised to
learn of Tito's aims and aspirations. The u. s.
supported the Royal Government-In-Exile and saw no
reason to deviate from this support even though it
was at the same time giving military assistance to
Tito because he was resisting the Germans. Since
the American military interest in the Balkans was
peripheral, it took the u. S. government a long·
time--until late 1944--to become involved in the
political situation in Yugoslavia, and then only
because of British pressure.5
Roberts wrote that America finally became aware of
Tito's aspirations by the end of 1944, but did little to
elaborate on this topic.

He did write that Yugoslavia was

hardly mentioned at Yalta and other conferences, which has
been denied by very few writers, including this author.
Unlike Roberts, and, for that matter, the remainder of the
authors to be discussed, this paper continues after most of
them have finished; and its topic is narrower.

This author

spent a great deal of time discussing Yugoslav internal
politics and how they fit into America's position in the
post-war world.
Harry M. Chase, Jr.'s book, American-Yugoslav
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Relations, 1945-19661

A Study in the Motivation of U.S.

Foreign Policy, was written from his doctoral dissertation.
It is a case study of how American foreign policy is
formulated and put into motion.

Unfortunately, the majority

of this book covered an era outside the scope of this paper.
In the corresponding section of Chase's book, his and this
author's bibliographies closely parallel one another, with
one notable exception.

Chase used the Congressional Record,

a source which neither this author nor any of the others
mentioned in this paper used to any extent.

He also used

the Department of State's Bulletin more than this author
did1 this author found the Bulletin to be of limited use and
not specific enough for his topic.

Chase wrote his

dissertation before the Foreign Relations of the United
States volumes had been published covering the time frame of
his and this paper.

Regardless of this, he would have found

little to have helped his writing.
The Foreign Relations of the United States spent very
little time discussing Congress and only devoted a few pages
to discussing individual congressmen.

This author's

findings on the topic of Yugoslav-American relations showed
that Congress had, overall, very little importance and was
not considered by the State Department when formulating
policy in Yugoslavia. -There are, of course, valid reasons
for this, the most important being that Yugoslavia was of
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little importance to the United States, both before and
during the war--a fact that Chase stressed on more than one

occasion.

Also, Congress had virtually no access to the

political events within Yugoslavia during this period and,
with the lack of large numbers of Yugoslav immigrants in the
United States, had little reason to concern itself anyway.
In defense of Chase, Congress did play a more active role in
Yugoslav matters after the Yugoslav-Russian break in 1948,
but again, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Chase sums up pre-war American-Yugoslav relations as
n

• characterized by the lack of any real significance
6

for either nation."

During the war years, he stated that

Churchill led the policy decisions on Yugoslavia and that
American relations " • • • did not possess any intrinsic
closeness throughout the war; that is, they were not
important in and of themselves, but were merely a minor
issue in the total picture of the war effort and its major
7
feature: the necessity of defeating Germany."
Chase differed little from the others mentioned in this
respect and can again be found in general agreement as he
characterized American concerns with Yugoslavia at Potsdam
and Yalta as minimal at best.

He was interested in

Congressional response to Yugoslav matters which separated
him from the other authors, as none of them addressed this
topic in their works.

He wrote concerning this issue:
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Legislative attitudes toward Yugoslavia present
some lack of any definitive policy, or basis for
policy, which we have also seen as characteristic
of the Executive Branch of government, especially

during the months of 1945.

Indeed, the few

references to Yugoslavia present a picture of
changing sentiment toward Yugoslavia, but no hint
of any formulated ideas about policy to be
pursued.8
Gabriel Kolko's The Politics of War:

---

The World and

United States Foreign Policy, 1939-1945 was written from a
perspective different from any of the other works studied on
this topic.

His position, simply stated, was that the

United States were interested in preventing any large-scale
penetration of Yugoslavia by either the Soviet Union or, in
particular, by Great Britain.

He wrote that the United

States was incompetent and psychologiclly ill-prepared to
deal with the left-leaning governments of Europe--Tito and
Yugoslavia in particular.
familiar territory.

Kolko's research is based on

He used State Department documents

(Foreign Relations of the United States), Truman's
Memoirs, Churchill's Closing the Ring and Triumph and
Tragedy, Joseph Grew's Turbulent Era:

A Diplomatic Record

of Forty Years, 1904-1945, Volume !!_, and various Yugoslav
sources, including Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Velebit.
This author found that his research led him to far different
conclusions and that Kolko contradicted himself in several
respects.
Kolko wrote:
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The consideration which entered State Department
discussions more often than Russian domination or
an undemocratic state after the war was the danger

of the preeminent role of Britain in shaping
Yugoslavia and South Balkan Affairs.9
This author cannot judge how Kolko came to this
conclusion.

The State Department papers spent a great deal

of time dealing solely with the growing totalitarian state
in Yugoslavia and how agreements made to insure the
democratic freedoms for all of liberated Europe were being
ignored at worst or simply being paid lip service in
Yugoslavia.

To be sure, the Americans did not fully agree

with British policy in Yugoslavia and the Balkans because
they judged this area to be of secondary importance and felt
that it would lead to the use of war materials needed in
more pressing areas.

The State Department did follow

Britain's activities here with interest, but was never
greatly worried about British domination.
Kolko described the British evacuation of Tito from the
Yugoslav mainland to the Adriatic island of Vis as an
attempt by the British to force political concessions on
him.

It can be argued that they tried to influence Tito,

but found him a very hard man to coax.
~

Kolko wrote that
I

Tito was forced to negotiate with Suba~ic, but in light of
the eventual outcome of these negotiations, Tito could only
be delighted.

It was odd that Tito could be forced to deal

with Suba~ic, but under far more promising circumstances on
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the Italian mainland, the British were unable to start any
negotiations at all between Tito and the Yugoslav King.
The American policy of giving support to Mihailovit was
described by Kolko as "absurd."

He seemed to forget or
v

ignore the services provided by the Cetniks.

Throughout

v

most of the war, the Cetniks rescued and returned downed
American airmen at some considerable risk to themselves.
Kolko wrote, "In practice, consistent opposition to the only
plausible alternatives left in Yugoslavia, rather than
10

positive proposals, characterized American policy."
Kolko, by his statement, seems to believe that Yugoslavia
had no other option than to accept Tito and his Partisans as
leaders of that country.

It was obviously the eventual

outcome, but was surely not the only alternative.

In

particular, the United States or Great Britain could have
forced the King to return, or Yugoslavia could have been
divided up into the separate republics of Serbia, Croatia,
etc.
In discussing Tito's relations with the Soviet Union,
Kolko wrote:
Tito went to Moscow because his relations with the
Russians were also in disarray. • • • In reality,
his relations with the Soviet Union had never been
cordial, and nothing in the unequal character of
Yugoslav Communism was intended to endear it to
Moscow.11
These contentions ring hollow to this author.

First, Tito
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had spent years in the Soviet Union and was, in fact, placed
at the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party by the Russians.
It must also be pointed out that Tito and the Yugoslav
Communists did not take to the field against their country's
occupiers until after the Soviet Union was invaded and
Moscow put out a call for all Communists to come to the aid
of the Soviet Union.

It should also be pointed out that

while in Moscow, Tito helped arrange for the smooth
penetration of the Soviet forces into Yugoslavia and their
handing over of liberated Yugoslav territory to Tito and his
Partisans.

Later in 1948, Tito would not go to Moscow

because of his fear of the Russians, but in 1944, he felt no
compulsion and went to ask for military aid, which was
granted him.
Kolko also wrote that the Soviets "instantly recognized
Tito as a challenge to whatever position, passive or
12

dominant, they would define for themselves in the area."
He also wrote that by 1944 the Soviets viewed Tito as a
"major threat" and that the United States should have been
able to anticipate the Yugoslav-Russian break of 1948.

This

author finds the above points very hard to understand:
first, that Tito apparently viewed the British as no threat
at all in the area, after the British had many times stated
their intention of dominating Yugoslavia and the Balkans;
and second, that the Soviet Union and Stalin believed that
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they would have little problem in influencing Yugoslav
politics to their ends.

The Russians would learn of the

fallacies of their arguments in 1948, but one could not
expect the United States to be able to interpret events it
knew little about when even the Russians, who were involved
first-hand, could not properly anticipate Yugoslav-Russian
political problems to come years later.
In discussing the Tito-Subasid Agreement, Kolko once
again drew strange conclusions.

He stated that because of

this Agreement "The United States lost its veto power over
13

Yugoslav politics •

"

This writer does not

comprehend the meaning of this statement.

Nowhere has he

found where the United States held any "veto" over Yugoslav
politics.

Later on the same page, Kolko said that the

Americans first supported Mihailovid and later switched
their support to the King.

,

Had Kolko forgotten that

Mihailovic was never independent of the King; that he had
v

led the Cetniks under his commission as an officer in the
Royal Army; that Mihailovicworked for the return of the
monarchy to Yugoslavia and was even a member of the King's
war cabinet?

/

Nowhere has this author found that Mihailovic

was other than a servant to his King.
Finally in this section, Kolko wrote of Tito:

"

But to the Americans he stood for foreign influences
of the Left, and Washington never critically questioned the
14
nature of America's opposition to Yugoslav desires."
This
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author can agree that the Americans saw Tito as a foreign

influence in Yugoslavia and that he was recognized as popular
by a large segment of the Yugoslav populace, but the State
Department devoted both time and effort to determining Tito's
actual standing in Yugoslavia.

The American Government

became disillusioned by Tito because of his methods and
ruthless consolidation of power.

It was continually

appalled at the lack of influence by pre-war politicians and
at the subjugation of any political dissent in Yugoslavia.
Most Americans at this time (Joseph Grew, an American
diplomat included), looked upon Tito as a Russian puppet who
did their bidding in the Balkans.

Grew wrote "that Tito was

not only proceeding to dominate the entire region which he
admitted he intended to keep under the Peace Treaty, that
15
Russia was undoubtedly behind Tito's move • • • • "
On page 345, Kolko made the following statements:
Yugoslavia represented the Eastern European future
the Americans most feared, for here the Russians,
British and Yugoslav Communists collaborated to
exclude American influence altogether • • • However,
a synthesis of Communism and nationalism was a
subtle concept with no place in Washington's

definition of the Left in Europe or anywhere else
for that matter.

16

Again Kolko contradicts himself.

He continually stresses

Tito and the Yugoslav Communists' independence of both
Britain and the Soviet Union, but here he stated that they
"collaborated."

It seemed then, according to Kolko, that

149

Tito both worked with the Russians, apparently for mutual
benefit, and he was also feared by the Russians for his
independence.

This author hates to be repetitive, but

again, the Americans were not interested in Yugoslavia.
Later, Kolko discussed the Tito-Subasic' Agreement,
explaining how it was set up by the British to insure their
position to oversee Yugoslav internal affairs.

The British

never did oversee Yugoslav affairs--again Kolko stretched the
point.

Finally, he explained how the Americans and British

reacted to Yugoslavia in the Trieste-Venezia Giulia region.
Kolko wrote that it was because of American influence
that the British agreed to pressure to give the Allied
Commander in the area the option of using force, but this
was after much pressure from Britain, as pointed out in
Foreign Relations of the United States and Grew's The
Turbulent Era, both sources Kolko said he used and quoted in
his book.
Kolko used the same source material as this author, but
seemed to give America a strong-willed policy to change the
course of internal events in Yugoslavia.

This author grants

him that American was not happy about the eventual outcome
in that country, but nowhere can he find concrete evidence
of American pressure and a strong-willed policy for that
country.

Robert Murphy wrote in Diplomat Among Warriors,

for example, that Roosevelt and America never had any firm
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policy for Yugoslavia, and this was another source that
Kolko cited.

Kolko contradicted himself as this author

points out above and seemed to read his source material
differently than this author or a historian such as Herbert
Feis.
Parallel in time and research material with Kolko were
the works of Herbert Feis:

From Trust to Terror, The Onset

of the Cold War, 1945-1952, Between War and Peace, The
Potsdam Conference, and Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, The
War They Waged and the Peace They Sought.

Kolko and Feis

wrote extensively on the diplomatic history of World War II
and the status quo in international relations following that
war.

However, their works do not say the same thing.

Kolko

takes a revisionist's view of these events and interprets
them under an eye that was trained to judge from a far more
questioning, or at least a less pro-Western, bias.

On the

other hand, Feis was a member of the State Department and
wrote from the perspective of one who dealt with these
issues and saw little reason to question the motives behind
American policy.
Although these men tend to disagree over most issues,
they do agree on one not insubstantial issue:

both found

Tito to be independent and to work with the Soviet Union
only inasmuch as it would benefit Yugoslavia.

However, as

this author has discussed above, Kolko contradicts himself
17
on his issue. Feis described Tito as "too independent"
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as he summed up Stalin's view of this Balkan leader.

He

also wrote of him as a man who considered himself the equal
of Stalin.
Regardless of these two men's views, which this
author believes to be colored with the knowledge of the
Yugoslav-Soviet break of 1948, this author found little
evidence to back Feis up.

Murphy hinted at Tito's

independence, but little concrete evidence was brought out
during the period covered by this paper.
Feis, on more than one occasion, described American
hesitancy in dealing with Tito and Yugoslavia as being due
to the unknown quality of Russian support.

He understood

that there was always the possibility of the State
Department underestimating Tito's relationship with the
Russians.

In Chapter 6 of Between War and Peace, The

Potsdam Conference, Feis discussed the problems of
Yugoslavia's border claims, but he could never tear himself
away from the fear of large Russian intervention on the side
of Tito.

It appeared that Tito, although an independent,

still must have at least a measure of Russian support.

The

Foreign Relations of the United States cited many examples
of American hesitancy and need for views of Russian thinking
towards Yugoslavia.

The diplomatic papers discussed and

gave examples of American correspondence sent to the
Russians.

The United States requested Russian aid in
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encouraging Tito to live up to the Yalta Declaration and
even printed the Russian refusal and belief that regarding
Yugoslavia the Yalta accords had been carried out.

They

also showed American requests for Russian assistance in
dealing with Tito's moves into Austria and Trieste.

The

Foreign Relations of the United States published Russian
requests for a Yugoslav zone of occupation in Austria, as
well as other Russian replies which seemed to fully back
Tito.
When Feis wrote about the events in Trieste and Venezia
Giulia, he described a much different situation than did
Kolko.

He also wrote at complete odds with Kolko concerning

American attempts at changing the internal events in
Yugoslavia.

Feis wrote that the Americans were concerned

with Great Britain, not because of their fear of British
domination in Yugoslavia (as Kolko wrote), but because the
United States wished to stay as far away from Yugoslav
affairs as practical.

Feis wrote that America wanted

Central and Eastern Europe to remain free of spheres of
influence and any tampering with internal affairs of these
countries (Yugoslavia included).

He wrote "that it

[the American government] did not want to become involved at
that time in decisions about frontiers or the internal
18

affairs of these countries."
Feis also pointed out that he doubted even joint
American-British military action in the Balkans could be
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substantial enough to dissolve Russian power and influence,
had they chosen such a route.

He pointed out in both

Between War and Peace, The Potsdam Conference and Churchill,
Roosevelt, Stalin:

The War They Waged and the Peace They

Sought that America was always worried about any lessening
of American war efforts in other theaters of operation--that
those war efforts would lessen if America were to strengthen
efforts in the Balkans.

He particularly pointed out how

senior members of the American government and military were
aginst war efforts in the Balkans, including General George

s.

Marshall, Admiral William Leahy, and President Truman.
Feis wrote of the State Department's response to the

Tito-~ubasicAgreement from a different angle than Kolko.

He described British support for this agreement, not as a
chance to increase their influence in Yugoslavia, but as an
attempt to break up the dam in Yugoslav politics.
correctly described
~

,

He

the State Department's response to the

Tito-Subasic Agreement.

He wrote that the State Department

recognized that this agreement would greatly favor one of
the elements in Yugoslavia (Tito) and was judged to be a
play at obtaining international recognition of Tito's
emerging government in Yugoslavia.

Other than pointing out

its news on the matter to the British after they requested
American support, the government did nothing.

This is a

significant departure from Kolko's description1 he viewed it
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as a failure of the American government to recognize the
status quo in Yugoslavia and as a step by the British to
greatly enhance their prestige in Yugoslavia at the expense
of a nervous America.

Once again, in contrast to Kolko's

claims, America did not act and stayed out of internal
Yugoslav affairs.

At Yalta, Feis described a joint

communique from Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill as urging
the Yugoslavs to implement this agreement.

Hostility, it

was felt, was never publicly announced by the Americans;
they, in fact, urged, rather than rejected, the
implementation of this agreement, according to Feis.
Another area in which Feis and Kolko disagree is in the
interpretation of American action vis-vis the Yugoslavs in
Trieste and in Venezia Giulia.

Here again, this writer

agrees with Feis, as pointed out earlier; Kolko contradicted
his own sources, while Feis wrote his narrative from
basically identical evidence.

Grew's Turbulent Era, a

Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1944, Volume !.!. was a
major source for Kolko's writing; Kolko wrote as though he
were in agreement with Grew's work, but his conclusions
actually were in disagreement with what Grew had said.

This

was particularly true in the area which dealt with the
United States' reaction to Tito.

That is, although the

United States finally stood up to Tito, it was at the urging
of Churchill and the British and not over their objections,
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as Kolko said.

The British were in constant contact with

the Americans concerning Yugoslavia's thrust into this area.

The Allied forces were under British command, and it was
only after insistent British diplomatic pressure that
America realized the situation and finally accepted the
British view, which was full support for possible military
action.
In this author's research, much evidence was found to
support the work of Feis, but little to support that of
Kolko.

Regardless of the similarity of source material,

Kolko's views and beliefs can only be explained by his proSoviet position.

He wrote consistently of America's and

Great Britain's anti-Yugoslav/Russian position.

According

to Kolko, the problems at the end of World War II were
caused by Western capitalistic greed and intrasigency, while
he depicted the Soviet Union as victimized and innocent •
Three foreign books shed a somewhat different light on
these issues as compared with the Feis or Kolko works.

Roy

Douglas, a British writer, said in From War to Cold War,
1942-1948 that it was the British who were responsible for
Tito's eventual success in Yugoslavia.

He wrote that "The

responsibility for Yugoslavia on a course towards communism
rests with Churchill and his advisors, not with the
19
Russians."
He described how the British led the way
toward Tito's recognition and support by the Allies during
the war.

The second book, also written by a British author,
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Mark

c.

Wheeler's Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940-

1943, agrees fully with Douglas' view.

Wheeler wrote in

many instances as if the United States did not exist when
writing about relations with Yugoslavia.

The third book,

Yugoslavia in the Second World War, was written and
published by three Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia.

It can be

legitimately assumed, although not absolutely verified, that
this book, published in 1967 in Belgrade, conformed to the
views of the Yugoslav government.
~

I

I

The authors, Zarko Atanackovic, Ahmet Donlagic,, and
~

~

Dusan Plenca, argued that the American government was a
hinderance to the new Yugoslavia " and continually raised
problrns to thwart its establishment."

They called the

United States " • • • one of the greatest obstacles to the
20
international recognition of the new Yugoslavia."
They
also pointed out, as the other authors did, that it was
Britain and not the United States which led in diplomatic
dealings with Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs wrote very

favorably concerning the help they received from the Soviet
Union during the war, although mentioning substantial
assistance from the United States and Great Britain.

They

cited the Soviet Union for its moral assistance and greater
understanding of the events in Yugoslavia.
As the Americans looked to the problems of Trieste as
an attempt by Yugoslavia to illegally claim territory that
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did not belong to it, the Yugoslavs viewed the Americans and
the British as provoacateurs who had no right or need to
interfere in this situation.
"

.,

I'

Subasic Agreement "

They also wrote that the Tito-

• was a major political victory for
21

the new Yugoslavia."

This is not surprising because it

allowed the present Yugoslav government to evolve and
eventually to formalize the "new Yugoslavia."
In this context of the Tito-~ubasicAgreement, the
United States was ignored.

This last book was written in a

tone that contradicts both Feis and Kolko on Yugoslavia's
relations with the Soviet Union.

The authors wrote from the

perspective that relations with the Russians were close and
that no substantial problems arose between the two countries
during the war.
Vojtech Mastny's Russia's Road to the Cold War
Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 19411945, was published in 1979, years after any of the
previously-mentioned studies.

He wrote after substantially

all the Western diplomatic sources had been made public and,
by his own admission, in response to what he called the
"fallacies of the revisionist historians."

He wrote only

indirectly about Yugoslav-American relations, but does
discuss Yugoslav-Russian relations during the war.
He wrote much about how Yugoslav Communist actions
disturbed Stalin and his plans for the war.

Stalin saw Tito

as too independent and perhaps dangerous in maintaining
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close and profitable relations with the Western Allies.

returned to this premise on other occasions.

He

Mastny wrote

that Stalin was flabbergasted at the Jajce Declaration and
only acquiesed when no protests were forthcoming from the
West.

In these remarks, Mastny closely parallels Kolko's

projection of Yugoslavia as a thorn in the Russian's side,
but he was in disagreement with Kolko in other areas of
Yugoslav-Russian relations.
Whereas Kolko wrote that Tito acted almost totally
independently of the Soviet Union on the matter of Venezia
Giulia, Mastny wrote that Churchill received a message from
Stalin that gratuitously aggravated the situation in support
of the Yugoslavs.

Mastny also wrote, in complete

contradiction to Kolko, that Moscow was drawn into Balkan
affairs by "Communist action and Western inaction."
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF THE TITO-SUBASIC AGREEMENT
Agreement
between the President of the National Committee of
Liberation of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime
Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Ivan Subasic.
In compliance with the principle of the continuity of
the Yugoslav State from the point of view of international
law·, and the clearly expressed will of all Yugoslav nations,
demonstrated by their four year's struggle for a new,
independent and federal State, built up on the principles of
democracy, we desire and make every effort for the people's
will to be respected at every step and by everybody, both
with regard to the internal organization of the State and to
the form of government, and therefore intend to comply with
the fundamental and general principles of constitutional
government proper to all truly democratic States.
Yugoslavia being acknowledged among the United Nations
in its established form, and functioning as such, we shall
continue to represent our country abroad and in all acts
pertaining to foreign policy in the same way, up to the time
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when our State, the democratic, federative Yugoslavia of the
future, assumes, by a free decision of the people, the
definite form of its government.
In order to avoid any possible tension of relations in
the country, we have agreed that King Peter II shall not
return to the country until the people have promounced their
decision in this respect, and that in his absence the Royal
Power should be wielded by a Regency Council.
The Regency Council will be appointed by a
constitutional act of the King, on the proposal of the Royal
Government, and in agreement with the President of the
National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal J.
B. Tito, and the President of the Royal Government, Dr. Ivan
Subasic.

The Regenqy Council take their oath to the King,

while the Government take their oath to to people.
The President of the National Committee of Liberation
of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the President of
the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Subasic, with the full
concurrence of the Anti-Fascist Council of Liberation of
Yugoslavia, agree that the Government be formed as follows:

179

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

President
Vice-President
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of the Interior
Minister of National Defense
Minister of Justice
Minister of Education
Minister of Finance
Minister of Trade and Industry
Minister of Communications
Minister of Post, Telegraphs and Telephone
Minister of Forests
Minister of Mines
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Social Welfare
Minister of National Health
Minister of Public Works
Minister of Reconstruction
Minister of Food
Minister of Information
Minister for Colonization
Minister for the Constituent Assembly
Minister of State for Serbia
Minister of State for Croatia
Minister of State for Slovenia
Minister of State for Montenegro
Minister of State for Macedonia
Minister of State for Bosnia-Hercegovina

This form of government in Yugoslavia shall remain in
force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, i.e.,
until the final constitutional organization of the State will
be established.
The new government will publish a declaration
proclaiming the fundamental principles of the democratic
liberties and guaranteeing their application.

Personal

freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of
conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, freedom
of assembly and association will be specifically emphasized
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and guaranteed7 and, in the same way, the right or property
and private initiative.

The sovereignty of the national

individualities within the State and their equal rights will
be respected and safeguarded, as decided at the Second
Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation
of Yugoslavia.

Any predominance of one nation over another

will be excluded.
November 1, 1944
The President of the Royal
Yugoslav Government
Dr. Ivan Subasic

The President of the National
Committee of the Liberation
of Yugoslavia
J. B. Tito

